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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
ON FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 
Rhonda L. Myers 
Old Dominion University, 2011 
Director: Dr. Berhanu Mengistu 
The growing presence and transient nature of for-profit higher education 
institutions in the US pose governance and regulatory challenges for bureaucratic 
structures, legislatures and non-profit postsecondary institutions. One such challenge is 
the perceived lack of governance and regulation of for-profit higher education 
institutions. This paper examines the impact of the higher education regulatory 
environment in the US on the presence of for-profit higher education institutions. 
Ordinal logistic regression is employed to determine whether state higher education 
governance structure, regulatory characteristics, and/or regional accreditation agency 
jurisdiction influence the prevalence of for-profit colleges and universities. State higher 
education governance structure and two regional accrediting agency jurisdictions 
(Middles States Association of Colleges and Schools, New England Association of 
Colleges and Schools) were found to contribute to the presence of fewer for-profit 
postsecondary institutions. The results suggest the need for strengthened state 
governance, as well as laws and policies that are congruent with state and federal 
economic development goals. 
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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
Higher education has been a staple of American culture since before the days the 
founding fathers of the United States of America (US) began framing the constitution. 
The first US colleges and universities, called the colonial colleges, were established in 
Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island, and New Hampshire. In 1636, the first degree-granting college, New College, 
currently Harvard University, was established in Massachusetts. The second institution 
in the US was The College of William and Mary in Virginia in 1693. These two 
institutions were primarily established as private, religiously influenced institutions along 
the eastern coastline of the US. The east coast was a popular location because of its 
population density, and it was also a hotbed of American political thought and 
implementation of American federalism. American federalism allows the 50 US states to 
govern a number of different ways, provided that they each adhere to the requirements of 
federal laws. The result, as it relates to higher education governance, is the existence of 
state higher education agencies with different governance structures and varied 
regulations of higher education institutions. 
Currently, approximately 4,409 colleges and universities operate with a physical 
presence across the US (NCES, 2009). These institutions include private and public, 
non-profit and for-profit, religious-based and nonsectarian, technical and career, 2- and 4-
year, and graduate level. Enrolling approximately 17 million students, US higher 
education institutions are spread across 50 states, the District of Columbia (DC) and 
Puerto Rico. Private and independent postsecondary education (PIPE) colleges and 
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universities make up roughly 62.2% (2,741) of degree-granting higher education 
institutions in the US (AGB, 2007; NCES, 2009). For-profit higher education institutions 
are colleges and universities registered as businesses and/or firms owned by a family (or 
individual), private or public corporation that earns profits (incur losses) from its 
operations. They are also referred to as proprietary colleges and/or universities. The total 
number of private for-profit degree-granting institutions in the US is 1,104, which 
accounts for 25.0% of all higher education institutions (NCES, 2009). The number of 4-
year degree-granting for-profit higher education institutions (FPHIED) is 530, 48% of 
for-profit higher education institutions and approximately 12% of total colleges and 
universities in the US. 
Higher Education Governance Structures 
Colleges and universities in the US are governed most directly at the institutional 
level. Boards of trustees and boards of governors set the direction of the institution. At 
the state level, however, higher education institutions are governed more indirectly by 
state higher education agencies. There are two governance structures of state higher 
education agencies in the US. In state higher education agencies in the US, governing 
bodies, which are strong forms of governance, and coordinating bodies, which are weak. 
A strong form of governance is defined as those structures established by legislative 
action. Strong governance structures are not easily changed by the state government or 
the state agency. Governing bodies can require the participation and compliance of its 
constituents. A weak form is defined as those organizations that have been given 
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authority by their respective state legislatures. Coordinating bodies exert persuasive 
power over their constituents to accomplish tasks. 
Governing boards are characterized as statutory bodies ".. .established by 
legislation in the form of statutes or legal instruments" to conduct state higher education 
business (Thynne, 2006, p. 172). More than half (28) of the states in the US have 
legislatively sanctioned boards charged to govern their respective state higher education 
system (SHEEO, 2008). These types of agencies are set up by legislative action that is 
not easily changed by the government or the agency. The work of governing boards, 
therefore, must be aligned with legislative objectives and the legislature must be actively 
involved in their work. With governing boards, respective legislatures are obligated to 
oversee and review activities, and hold them accountable for their actions. For the 
purposes of this research, governing boards are considered to be the strong form of 
governance. 
Coordinating bodies are state higher education agencies with legislatively 
delegated authority, established to serve as a link between legislative bodies and higher 
education institutions. These agencies organize the desires of the legislature and 
communicate the needs of the higher education institutions. Because coordinating bodies 
lack the regulatory and statutory power of governing boards, they are considered the 
weak form of state higher education governance. Coordinating bodies are characterized 
primarily by the principle-agent nature of their relationship with the legislature 
(McLendon, 2003). The legislature (principal) assigns tasks to the state agency (agent), 
which carries out the work. Their authority is delegated by the legislature, and they are 
restricted in their regulatory and administrative power. In other words, the coordinating 
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bodies attempt to persuade their constituents to participate in studies, research, meetings, 
etc., whereas governing boards mandate participation. Additionally, they work with their 
constituents to conduct research, advocate on behalf of institutions, and administer 
funding allocations and programs. According to the State Higher Education Executive 
Officers (SHEEO), there are approximately 22 coordinating bodies in the US (including 
DC). Michigan does not have a state higher education agency. 
State Higher Education Regulatory Characteristics 
State higher education agencies differ in their governance structures and vary in 
the higher education regulatory characteristics they exhibit. A review of the websites of 
US state higher education agencies illustrate distinctive differences associated with the 
ability to restrict the operations of PIPE institutions. The categories include no ability to 
restrict operations with a physical presence in a state, and ability to restrict operations 
with a physical presence in a state by: 1) registration and state agency approval, and 2) 
registration, state agency approval and required US Department of Education (DOE) 
approval. US DOE approval is directly linked to an institutions ability to gain 
accreditation from an approved agency. Accreditation is defined as a voluntary, peer-
reviewed process in which an institution or programs agrees to engage in self-study. The 
self-study examines the success of the institution and/or program in meeting the 
characteristics of an educational program as prescribed by the respective accrediting 
agency and how well it fulfills its own mission (Bloland, 1999). The numbers of states in 
each regulatory characteristic category outlined above are 18, 18 and 15, respectively 
(N=51, including DC). While Michigan does not have a state higher education agency 
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solely dedicated to coordinating or governing higher education, it does, however, require 
state level approval for FPHIEDs to operate within its borders. 
State regulatory characteristics are considered to be more stringent when 
additional requirements are mandated. For example, states that require for-profit higher 
education institutions to complete a paper registration process (including fee payment) 
are deemed less rigid than states that require state higher education agency approval 
process. The latter is deemed less strict than states that require accreditation by a US 
DOE approved agency. Each category of higher education regulatory characteristics 
carries the trait(s) of the previous level plus an additional requirement. 
Regional HIED Accreditation 
There are six regional accrediting agencies authorized by the US DOE to accredit 
higher education institutions in the US. The names and jurisdictions of the regional 
accrediting agencies are outlined in Appendix A. Each agency establishes its own 
standards and procedures for achieving accreditation. Because these standards are 
created autonomously, there is the perception of different standards across regional 
accrediting agencies. On one hand some higher education theorists argue that the North 
Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCACS) is the most accommodating 
towards FPHIEDs and virtual postsecondary institutions (Kinser, 2005). In fact, a recent 
US DOE Inspector General's report was unable to determine the effectiveness of NCACS 
in managing its control of institutional adherence to its standards (US DOE, 2010). The 
report expressed concerns that NCACS did not operate in the best interests of students. It 
fully accredited a for-profit higher education institution that it found to have "egregious" 
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issues that violated the agency's standards. NCACS is considered to be more lax when 
compared with the other agencies in its regulation of FPHIEDs. On the other hand, 
practitioners claim that the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) is the 
most stringent of all six regional accrediting agencies (AAUP, 2007). 
Operations of Higher Education: Virtual and Physical 
Regardless of the accrediting agency, higher education institutions operate or 
conduct business in two ways: virtually or physically. Those institutions that operate 
virtually solely offer online degree programs. Virtual institutions and programs do not 
require individuals to attend classes in a physical location. These institutions may or may 
not operate a physical campus. For example, the University of Phoenix (UOP) has a 
Delaware campus that is totally virtual. The institution does not operate with a physical 
campus in the state of Delaware (NCES, 2009). While virtual degree programs are 
typically associated with FPHIEDs, increasingly more traditional public and non-profit 
postsecondary institutions offer virtual degree programs, such as Liberty University. 
In addition to virtual operations, higher education institutions operate with a 
physical presence. Physical campus locations are historically linked with traditional 
higher education institutions. Students physically attend classes in a specified location 
associated with the institution. Examples include The Ohio State University campuses in 
Columbus, Lima, Mansfield, Marion and Newark, and the Tampa, FL campuses of the 
University of Phoenix located in various office parks in and around the Tampa 
metropolitan area. 
Higher education has expanded and changed dramatically since its inception in 
1636. It is ripe for further study given the different forms of state higher education 
governance, differing state regulatory characteristics, diverse regional accreditation 
standards. This research examines the higher education regulatory environment and its 
impact on for-profit higher education institutions. It focuses on those FPHIEDs with a 
physical presence. 
The remaining sections of this chapter present the statement of the problem 
followed by the theoretical framework that includes the conceptual model. Then, the 
research methodology is presented. The importance of the study and definition of terms 
conclude this chapter. 
Statement of the Problem 
Today higher education faces a few challenges. The complexity associated with 
private higher education governance is one challenge. Another issue is the varied policy 
making that impacts both individual institutions and the industry overall. The growing 
presence and transient nature of for-profit higher education poses governance and 
regulatory challenges for bureaucratic structures, legislatures, and postsecondary 
institutions. One recent issue is the perceived lack of regulation of for-profit higher 
education institutions from state and federal governments (McLendon, Deaton & Hearn, 
2007). There has been increasing criticism of for-profit higher education institutions 
regarding the use of public funds and questionable recruitment practices (GAO, 2009 & 
2010), programmatic quality (Kelly, 2001), and "accreditation shopping" (Kinser, 2005). 
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Higher education governance requires that all higher education institutions that 
desire access to billions of dollars of Title IV federal student aid dollars must be 
accredited by a US DOE approved agency (US DOE, 2009). Six regional accrediting 
agencies are approved by the US DOE. An institution that receives accreditation from 
one of these agencies is eligible to receive Title IV federal student aid funds. The 
jurisdiction of regional accrediting agencies is based on the state in which the 
college/university has a physical presence. Thus, each US state falls under the authority 
of one of six regional accrediting agencies (i.e., the state of Virginia falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools). Therefore, colleges 
and universities operating within that state are accountable to the standards established by 
the corresponding regional accrediting agency. 
The ability to regulate higher education and hold institutions accountable are 
related to two challenges. First, US DOE recognized regional accrediting agencies serve 
as by-proxy regulators of higher education in the US. By-proxy regulation suggests there 
is limited direct federal regulation of higher education. Second, the requirement to obtain 
accreditation results in "accreditation shopping." Accreditation shopping occurs when 
colleges and universities establish institutions in states under the jurisdiction of more 
accommodating accrediting agencies (Kinser, 2005). Accreditation shopping is an 
example of what Predohl (1928) refers to as substitution, which happens when a firm 
chooses the most efficient means of obtaining a desired result. In this case, the desired 
result is regional accreditation. 
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Research Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the governance of higher education. This 
research focuses on determining the higher education regulatory factors that influence the 
prevalence of for-profit higher education institutions in the US. There are some states in 
the US wherein no proprietary higher education institutions operate with a physical 
presence within its borders. Other states have more than 50 for-profit higher education 
institutions (NCES, 2009). This study seeks to gain insight into the higher education 
governance factors that make some states more appealing for FPHIEDs than others, with 
the goal of determining if states should regulate more or less. 
Research Question 
The research question is "What higher education governance factors influence the 
presence of 4-year, degree-granting for-profit higher education institutions in the US? " 
The higher education governance factors include state postsecondary regulatory 
characteristics, state higher education agency governance structure, and regional 
accreditation. Therefore, this study is designed to first examine the impact of the higher 
education regulatory environment on the number of FPHIEDs. Secondly, the study 
assists states in determining if they should regulate more or less by creating a model that 
best predicts the prevalence of for-profit higher education institutions. 
Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation research assumes that stronger higher education regulations 
result in fewer for-profit higher education institutions, and likewise, weaker regulations 
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result in more. The foundation of this hypothesis was noted with the mercantile system 
in the early years of America. According to Edwards (1998), independent competitors 
conducted business in the suburbs and rural areas in order to flee regulatory influence 
because regulatory enforcement was strongest in the cities. Other examples are seen with 
US companies moving operations from the US to Mexico to decrease costs associated 
with compliance with regulatory mandates including, but not limited to, wages and labor 
laws. 
One of the most politically vocalized reasons for government regulations is 
citizen and consumer protection. Regulation can be thrust upon industry as a result of 
pressures placed on policy-makers (Peltzman, 1986). In this instance, governmental 
regulation is established to protect the interests of the public, balance the playing fields 
within industry, and to restrict or minimize corruption (Stigler, 1971). Protecting the 
public interest from industry appeals to politicians because it provides a platform on 
which to base industry regulation and help garner support to for re-election to office. 
Weighty attention to industry interests result in corruption, moral hazard, and ultimately 
market failures. This constitutes the normative theory of market-failure, or public interest 
theory of regulation, which legitimates regulations in the face of deficiency in the market 
(Edwards & Edwards, 1974; Jakee & Allen, 1998). 
Economic regulation theorists argue that government regulations serve a number 
of functions for industry, or private interests, however. For example, Stigler (1971) 
suggests one function of regulation is to restrict the entry of new competitors into the 
industry, therefore benefitting current industry members. Restricting new competitors is 
the major desire companies that seek regulation. In the higher education environment, 
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traditional 4-year institutions have advocated for increased regulations of PIPE 
institutions, including FPHIEDs, citing programmatic (academic) and funding 
constraints, unfair restrictions that limit their ability to be competitive. If successful, 
subsequent regulations will serve to limit the entry of new for-profit institutions into the 
higher education industry. 
Coercion to mandate industry adherence to regulations is another function of 
governmental regulation. In order for higher education institutions to gain access to $80 
billion in annual Title IV federal student aid funds, they must meet accreditation 
requirements of US DOE approved agencies. The "control by purse-strings" technique 
(Millett, 1970; Weingast & Moran, 1983) employed by the US DOE serves the interest of 
accredited institutions and the regional accrediting agencies. This strategy validates the 
legitimacy of the work of regional accrediting agencies and ensures compliance by 
institutions. In return it minimizes the role of the US DOE in the regulatory environment. 
Mandating regulatory compliance benefits colleges/universities with accreditation and the 
accrediting agencies because it serves as a stamp of institutional quality. It is used as a 
recruitment tool to distinguish between credible accredited institutions and diploma mills 
(Kinser, 2005). Diploma/degree mills are businesses that offer postsecondary degrees, 
diplomas or certificates that require little or no education or coursework to obtain such a 
degree, diploma or certificate (US DOE, 2009). 
While there are benefits to regulation, there are also disadvantages. The 
administrative costs of bureaucracy can increase as a result of regulatory implementation 
(Chhibber, 1997; Stigler, 1971). This serves as a drawback of regulation. When industry 
is regulated there is often a regulatory establishment created with direct oversight for that 
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area (Shavell, 1984). For example, in all states in the US except Michigan there is a 
publicly funded office that operates to oversee the quality, direction and funding of 
public, and sometimes private higher education institutions. As it is with regulation, 
administrative costs are borne whether harm has occurred or not. Even as the risk of 
harm is eliminated, administrative costs to the state are still incurred (Shavell, 1984). 
Another difficulty purported by regulatory theorists is that regulation is influenced 
by outsiders (from industry) who are given an influential voice in the political process. 
Politicians and interest groups compete to influence regulators and regulatory decisions 
(Peltzman, 1976; Spiller, 1990; Stigler, 1971). Industry influence comes by way of 
political support to elected officials and industry jobs for regulators. The latter has been a 
common occurrence with the staff members of state higher education agencies. Staff 
members are often lured away by higher education institutions (industry) after serving 
time with the state (regulatory) agency. A recent example includes the hiring of Dr. 
Daniel LaVista, former Executive Director of the State Council of Higher Education for 
Virginia (SCHEV), as the new Chancellor of the Los Angeles Community College 
District. 
The change in the distribution of control among firms presents another challenge 
associated with regulation (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). Intuitively, companies with 
smaller shares of the market have less political influence. In the regulated environment, 
however, smaller firms with greater political pull have more power in the industry. This 
has also occurred in public higher education. Legislatures have historically been 
responsive to institutions considered to be more politically powerful regardless of size 
(Gove & Floyd, 1975). The College of William and Mary (CWM) is an example of the 
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changes in distribution of control in the higher education environment in Virginia. While 
CWM is one of the smaller public institutions in the state, conversations with staff of 
SCHEV suggest that CWM has significant political pull. One reason is the presence of 
its alumni base in the influential bowels of state and federal government. The other 
reason is its historical significance to the state itself. In the for-profit arena of higher 
education, larger and more profitable institutions such as the University of Phoenix are 
able to participate in higher levels of political lobbying. This is because of their size and 
profitability. Changes in the distribution of control in the political arena allow higher 
education institutions with political weight, larger enrollments and/or higher profits to 
exert more influence in the sector. 
The research presented here assumes that for-profit higher education 
institutions will operate in ways that are similar to their more traditional for-profit peers. 
There will be more for-profit higher education institutions in states that exhibit weak 
governance structures and regulatory characteristics. It is not expected that the type of 
work conducted by the organization (i.e., providing educational services versus providing 
more traditional commodities/goods) will influence the direction of the hypothesized 
relationships outlined below. 
Conceptual Model 
The number of for-profit higher education institutions with a physical presence in 
a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) serves as the dependent variable (Tole & Koop, 
2009; Zucker, Darby & Brewer, 1998). The independent variables of interest are based 
on current elements of the higher education regulatory environment outlined in the higher 
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education literature. They include state higher education governance structure, state 
higher education regulatory characteristics, and regional accreditation, all of which are 
state level variables. 
Additional regressors are identified in the education, business and economic 
literatures as confounding variables expected to influence the operation of for-profit 
higher education institutions. They include population (Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan & Berg, 
2003), median family income (Hoke, 1998), unemployment rate (Hoke, 1998), 
educational attainment (Becker, Ekholm, Jackie & Meundler, 2004; Harris, 2001; Henisz 
& Macher, 2004), racial composition (GAO, 2009 & 2010) and corporate taxation. 
Consequently, this study attempted to control for the impact of the above-listed variables 
on the dependent variable. Figure 1.1 below details the conceptual model that guided the 
direction of this research. 
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As depicted in Figure 1.1 above, this dissertation will test the following hypotheses: 
Hi: Stronger state higher education governance structures are more likely to 
result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H2: Stronger state higher education regulatory characteristics are more likely to 
result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H3: NCACS jurisdiction is more likely to result in higher numbers of FPHIEDs 
than states in other regional accrediting agency jurisdictions (i.e., MSACS, 
NEACS, NWCCU, SACS and WASC). 
H4: Higher populations are more likely to result in higher numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H5: Higher median family income is more likely to result in lower numbers of 
FPHIEDs. 
He: Higher unemployment rates are more likely to result in higher numbers of 
FPHIEDs. 
Hja: Higher rates of high school completion are more likely to result in lower 
numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H7b: Higher rates of bachelor's degree completion are more likely to result in 
lower numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H7C: Higher rates of advanced degree completion are more likely to result in 
lower numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H8: Higher rates of Blacks in the population are more likely to result in higher 
numbers of FPHIEDs. 
H9: Higher state corporate tax rates are more likely to result in lower numbers of 
FPHIEDs. 
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Importance of the Study 
Examining the impact of the higher education regulatory environment on the 
presence of FPHIEDs in the US is useful. It assists states and federal agencies in 
determining whether or not current policies promote, encourage, constrain or restrict the 
operation of 4-year, for-profit higher education institutions. Examining the effectiveness 
of current higher education governance and policy is significant. The underlying goal of 
these and other public policies is to maximize the public good by promoting an educated 
citizenry, social and economic development (Leach, 2008). A predictor model assists 
with the identification of factors that more heavily influence the operations of FPHIEDs. 
The result is improved policy formulation that maximizes the effectiveness of desired 
outcomes in public administration, education, business, and economic development. 
Additionally, it provides public administrators, educators, states and federal agencies a 
tool to assess the role of regulatory policies as incubators or detractors of for-profit 
higher education institutions. 
An in-depth, firm level study of the regulatory influences on the operations of 
for-profit higher education institutions is beneficial to the bodies of public 
administration, education, business and economic development literature and 
knowledge. It would, however, be premature. The lack of attention to FPHIED 
businesses require greater exploration before individual firm analysis can be conducted. 
A case study that inquires why one location is preferred by FPHIEDs over an alternative 




For-profit postsecondary education institutions, a relatively new and 
understudied sector of private business, presents an opportunity for research. For-profit 
higher education institutions are increasingly scrutinized for the quality of education 
they provide. They face allegations of fraudulent recruitment and marketing practices 
(GAO, 2010), selling degrees (Kinser, 2005), improprieties associated with Title IV 
funding, and higher than average federal loan default rates (GAO, 2009 & 2010; Kelly, 
2001). These criticisms have prompted calls for federal and state policies that protect 
citizens from fraudulent practices associated with FPHIEDs. An examination of the 
public administration, urban economic and business literatures reveals an abundance of 
research related to governance and its impact on business, but for-profit higher 
education institutions have been overlooked. 
The study addresses the gap in the knowledge of the operations of for-profit 
higher education institutions. It advances research relative to the influence of the higher 
education regulatory environment on for-profit organizations that educate US citizens 
beyond high school. 
Rationale 
Education consistently ranks near the top of the "public agenda" (Raffel, 2007). 
Public administration, however, often overlooks education as a part of the discipline and 
practice. An exception to this practice occurs when school districts are examined as the 
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backdrop to public administration research in the areas of personnel management and 
corruption (see Glasser, Denhart & Hamilton, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 2003 & 2004; 
Sagal, 2002). Raffel (2007) asserts public administration is concerned with the 
management of public programs with the ".. .exception] [of] the largest area of 
governmental expenditures and public concern - public education" (p. 135). In fact, in 
2003 approximately 7.0% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was attributed to 
education, with 2.9% of total GDP attributed to higher education (OECD, 2006). The 
higher education percentage (2.9%>) was ".. .higher than the percentage of GDP spent on 
education at this level than in any of the other G-8 countries [Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the US]" (OECD, 2006, p. 44). Just over 1/3 of all 
state expenditures are aimed at education, and 1/3 of that total supports higher education 
exclusively (Raffel, 2007). The amount of funding ascribed to higher education lends 
itself to support further study of the operation of higher education institutions in the US. 
In addition to receiving significant amounts of state and federal funds, higher 
education also contributes to regional and state economic development. Traditional 
economics-based research recognizes the importance of higher education to regional and 
state economies (Zucker, Darby & Brewer, 1998). Universities bring new money to 
states through research grants, federal financial aid, out-of-state student spending and 
other sources (Brown & Heaney, 1997). These dollars are multiplied throughout the 
state economy making higher education a good economic investment and a good 
investment in human capital (Blackwell, Cobb & Weinberg, 2002). Higher education 
must continuously be studied from a cost/benefit perspective and in the evaluation of its 
efficiency and effectiveness in the achievement of desired outcomes. 
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McLendon et al (2007) calls for the need to examine the relationships between 
political institutions and public policy outcomes in higher education. Previous literature 
has excluded the ".. .role that formal political institutions might play in shaping state 
policy choices for higher education" (McLendon et al, 2007, p. 667). An examination of 
the higher education governance factors that influence the operations of FPHIEDs can 
further assist the federal government and states with creating the proper mix of 
regulations, funding and investment incentives that encourage more businesses and 
industries to operate within their respective borders. This research provides an empirical 
foundation to examine state higher education governance structure, policies, regulatory 
characteristics and levels, and federal policies and regulations. 
As higher education institutions, for-profits provide benefits beyond those 
traditionally attributed to business and industry. They assist in producing an educated 
citizenry and skilled adult labor force. An educated citizenry promotes citizen 
participation, higher quality of life and higher earning potential (Milligan, Moretti & 
Oreopoulos, 2004). In addition, for-profit higher education institutions generate tax 
revenues and jobs, all of which make this study important to public administration, 
higher education and economic development. 
There are a number of implications for this research. First, bureaucrats, 
legislatures and policy-makers may be required to reexamine higher education 
governance and policy as a result of this research. The second implication is the 
potential for increased regulation and accountability of for-profit higher education 
institutions. The third inference is the possibility for increased workload and costs 
pertaining to the oversight and regulation of FPHIEDs. This is especially true for those 
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agencies that currently have limited to no oversight of the for-profit sector of higher 
education. 
Limitations 
This study focuses on the state higher education governance factors that 
influence the presence of 4-year, degree-granting for-profit higher education institutions. 
It is, however, delimited by its scope. In 2009 there were 1,104 for-profit degree-
granting postsecondary education institutions in the US including 4- and 2-year 
institutions (NCES, 2009). Only 4-year, for-profit degree-granting higher education 
institutions are examined in this study because their number is more manageable 
(N>530). Therefore, the results are not generalizable to 2-year, degree-granting for-
profit higher education institutions, which account for more than half of the entire for-
profit higher education population. 
Threats to the validity of this study serve as limitations. One such threat is the 
use of secondary data. The accuracy of the secondary data is, in most cases, unknown. 
For example, personal experience of the author pertaining to the US Census collection 
techniques as a part of the decennial census (2010) was a cause for concern. Double 
counting and undercounting in rural and gated communities resulted from the data 
collection policies of the US Census and work habits of the enumerators. Therefore, the 
use of US Census data in this study is done so with caution (Babbie, 2001). 
Some measures of the dependent and independent variables may be indirect 
measures of the concepts outlined in this study and serve as a threat to construct validity. 
Babbie (2001) suggests that existing data often does not match exactly what we are 
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interested in, which result in measures that lack ".. .valid representations of the variables 
and concepts we want to make conclusion about" (p. 318). In order to overcome this 
limitation, the conceptual model was based largely on the literature related to FPHIEDs, 
location theory, and economic development. Therefore, the measures are theoretically 
grounded and heavily utilized in the above listed research areas. 
Another limitation is the potential failure to meet the assumptions of ordinal 
logistic regression. The violated assumption is the requirement that expected cell 
frequencies equal 5 or more in at least 80%> of cells. The inclusion of multi-state MSAs 
(N=45), which are missing state specific data for higher education governance factors, 




Higher education, public administration, economic development and location 
decision literature are reviewed in this chapter. The first section introduces the chapter. 
Then the gap in the literature is discussed. Next, higher education research in context of 
governance and regulation is examined, followed by a review of the literature on 
location decision determinants. The final section provides a summary. 
Introduction 
There is a growing body of literature examining governance and oversight of for-
profit higher education institutions. Relatively little attention, however, has been given 
to how governance and other factors affect for-profit higher education institutions. This 
research examines the impact of higher education governance on the presence of for-
profit higher education institutions. Location theory, studied in the context of for-profit 
businesses, has historically focused on transportation costs (McQuaid, Greig, Smyth & 
Cooper, 2004; Predohl, 1928), taxation (Cohen, 2000), land costs (Cohen, 2000; 
Halcrow Group, 2002 as cited in McQuaid et al, 2004), labor costs (Downes & 
Greenstein, 1996; Hoke, 1998; McQuaid et al, 2004; Rondinelli & Burpitt, 2000), 
bandwagon effects (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Henisz & Macher, 2004), and skill level of 
the labor force (Becker, Ekholm, Jackie & Meundler, 2004; Henisz & Macher, 2004; 
Sethi et al, 2003). As politicians and public administrators ".. .confront increased 
financial burdens and citizens' resistance to tax incentives, alternative policy 
instruments may be necessary" (Jeong & Feiock, 2006, p. 764). The underpinnings of 
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this study provide insight into effective, or ineffective, policy tools related to for-profit 
higher education. 
This research contributes to academic and pragmatic discourse on the impact of 
governance and regulation on for-profit higher education in the US. Secondarily, it 
provides tools to evaluate and enhance the effectiveness of desired outcomes in public 
administration, education, business and economic development related to FPHIED. This 
study also informs legislatures, bureaucrats, and policy-makers on the effectiveness of 
higher education governance across the US, better enabling them to make 
knowledgeable governance and policy decisions related to for-profit higher education 
institutions. 
While the focus of this study is on the impact of higher education governance 
factors on the presence of FPHIEDs, its theoretical underpinnings are embedded in 
location theory. The lack of research specific to the location decisions of for-profit 
higher education institutions requires an examination of other for-profit entities. This 
review of the literature examines two sets of factors that influence the location decisions 
of for-profit businesses including higher education institutions. The first set of factors 
includes the policy mechanisms such as regulation and political culture. The second set 
of factors reviewed consists of business-related and demographic determinants of 
location decisions. 
Research Gap 
Four methods were used to locate relevant studies. First, a review of reference 
lists from previously published articles on location decision-making by education 
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institutions, affiliates of education institutions and other for-profit businesses such as 
office firms and retail stores. Second, Public Affairs Information Service International 
(PAIS) and Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) databases were searched 
for articles published between 1990 and April 2010, using "location decisions" or 
"location decision-making" with each of the following keywords: "education," "higher 
education," "postsecondary," "post-secondary," "college(s)," "university(ies)," 
"school(s)," "literature review." The PAIS International database contains more than 
416 documents, journal articles, and monographs dedicated to the topic of location 
decision-making of private business and industry including. These entries include 
foreign direct investment (FDI), multinational enterprises (MNE), retail stores, office 
firms, high-technology industries. However, only 10 of those documents focus on 
location decision-making in the context of educational institutions, primarily its impact 
on residential location decisions. Three articles identify educational institutions as the 
location decision-makers, and their findings are based on designed research studies 
(Downes & Greenstein, 1996 & 2002; Egeln, Gottschalk & Rammer, 2004). The ERIC 
search resulted in more than 50 peer-reviewed documents committed to location 
decision-making in the context of education. The results from ERIC include K-12 and 
college choice, and residential location decisions. There are few reviews linking for-
profit higher education location decisions to governance factors such as political hazards 
and regulatory factors, or other factors such as demographic and business factors. 
Third, the keyword "location decisions" or "location decision-making" was 
searched as an article title, keyword, and subject. The search identified three articles 
tangentially related to this study. Fourth, relevant articles were searched by reviewing 
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the reference lists of the articles identified by PAIS International and ERIC databases 
that met inclusion criteria. The resultant search produced four articles applicable to the 
location decisions of education institutions. Overall the search did not produce much; 
hence there is indeed a gap in the literature. 
Higher Education Governance and Regulation 
Previous research on governance in US higher education focused almost 
exclusively on institutional-level governance (McLendon, 2003; McLendon et al, 2007). 
There are numerous quantitative and qualitative articles that examine boards of trustees, 
regents, faculty-based governance structures, etc. at the college level. Higher education 
governance at the state level, however, has been largely ignored by higher education, 
public policy and public administration researchers alike. At the federal level, 
governance and regulation has primarily consisted of proxy measures of federal 
regulation that rely heavily on regional accreditation agencies establishing and enforcing 
standards for US higher education. The incentive to adhere to regional accreditation 
standards lies in an institutions eligibility to receive Title IV federal student aid funds. 
More recently the former Deputy Undersecretary of the US DOE criticized the 
governance and regulation of higher education. In the April 29, 2010 edition of 
insidehighered.com, Deputy Undersecretary Shireman likened the accreditation agencies 
to Wall Street ratings agencies that are charged with regulating an industry they rely on 
for funding support. This claim is based on a "conflict of interest" assumption. 
Institutions pay accreditation agencies for membership, while agencies, in turn, regulate 
institutional quality. The absence of a coordinated system of regulation by accreditation, 
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state and federal agencies has resulted in a "lack of firepower" to regulate higher 
education in the US, according to former Deputy Undersecretary Shireman. This section 
will outline the current state of higher education governance and regulation at the state, 
federal and accreditation agency levels. 
State-Level Governance 
A number of states in the US redesigned their existing higher education 
governance systems more than 60 years ago. In fact, McLendon et al (2007) claim "The 
modern era of [US] public higher education governance dates to the late 1950s..." (p. 
647). During that time higher education was primarily unregulated. Postwar explosion 
of enrollments and public funding on higher education prompted an investigation into 
new governance models that would enhance efficiency and coordination. Today, the 
states accept more than half of the responsibility for the governance and finance of 
public colleges and universities. 
Since 2000, interest in the broader scope of governance of higher education 
systems has increased. Only a relatively few studies examine governance in state higher 
education agencies (Kezar, 2006; Shakespeare, 2008). One major study of state-level 
higher education governance was published by Kezar in 2006. In a qualitative study 
Kezar (2006) interviewed members of state higher education agencies, legislators and 
college presidents in an effort to examine the effectiveness of state higher education 
agencies. Relying heavily on business and management concepts, the author focused on 
the effectiveness of state higher education agencies, both governing boards and 
coordinating bodies. The limited attention to state-level governance has prompted some 
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academics in higher education policy to call for an extended research agenda that 
addresses the political implications and impacts of and on higher education (McLendon, 
2003). 
Federal-Level Governance and Accrediting Agencies 
In addition to state-level governance of US higher education institutions, there is 
a proxy for federal-level oversight of higher education: regional and national accrediting 
agencies. Accreditation arose as a means to differentiate college from high school 
education and to protect academic freedom. Present day ".. .[accreditation aims to 
preserve and enhance quality in higher education. It is a voluntary exercise in which an 
institution or program agrees to engage in self-study operating within the guidelines of a 
recognized accrediting agency" (Bloland, 1999, p. 362). Accreditation is a peer-
reviewed process that examines the success of the institution in meeting agency selected 
characteristics of a good quality educational program and fulfilling its own mission. 
Accrediting agencies are certified annually by the Secretary of Education, who 
influenced by the recommendations of the national accrediting association (Neal, 2008). 
Over the years there have been a number of national accrediting associations. The first 
was the Federation of the Regional Accrediting Commissions of Higher Education 
(FRACHE), followed by the National Commission on Accrediting (NCA). In 1975 the 
Council on Postsecondary Accreditation (COP A) was formed, with the Council for 
Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation (CORP A) following. In 1993 the CORP A 
was dissolved and, after three years of planning, the Commission on Higher Education 
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Accreditation (CHEA) was established. CHEA serves as the new national agency on 
accreditation today. 
The enforcement power of accreditation in the US is based on an institutions 
eligibility to receive Title IV funds. In the 1940s accreditation in the US was bound to 
the ability of an institution to receive federal funds and loans through the passage of the 
GI Bill. The use of accreditation served as a means for the federal government to ensure 
accountability without exerting direct federal control over higher education. Since the 
early 1990s, the US Department of Education used the accreditation process as a means 
to regulate postsecondary institutions (Bloland, 1999). The 1992 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act (1965) required accreditation by the recognized regional agencies 
as a condition of eligibility to receive Title IV federal student aid funds. As a result, 
accreditation became a highly contested issue that ignited significant debate within the 
higher education accreditation community. Practitioners and scholars were concerned 
with the amount of control and influence the federal government, through the US DOE, 
was exerting on schools and accrediting agencies. Accreditation and the accrediting 
agencies were increasingly viewed as being heavily influenced by federal and state 
governments, and therefore, not an independent entity (Bloland, 1999; Brittingham, 
2008). Some within the higher education industry argued that "education is not one of 
the powers delegated to the federal government" and, therefore, the federal government 
should mind its own business (Neal, 2008, p. 25). Others argued the need for federal 
regulation of higher education because of past practices of discrimination, skyrocketing 
costs of attendance and the large amounts of federal dollars that support higher 
education. 
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The use of accreditation as a means to become and remain eligible for Title IV 
funds led to speculation that some for-profit higher education institutions participate in 
"accreditation shopping" (Kinser, 2005, p. 76). Shopping for accreditation suggests an 
institution compares regional policies to determine which accrediting agency will be 
most obliging, then seeks accreditation from that agency (Kinser, 2005). Kinser (2005) 
presented a qualitative study of 65 for-profit institutions in the US, all of which were 
accredited by regional accreditation agencies. His work revealed inconsistencies in the 
operation of the six regional accrediting bodies. The lack of consistency could bolster 
concern that one agency's distinctive policies could cause ".. .regional accreditation as a 
national policy of quality control..." to suffer (p. 76). He found that in 2003 NCACS 
was the only regional accrediting agency to accredit all six virtual universities, which 
anecdotally suggests that NCACS is accommodating towards for-profit higher education 
institutions. NCACS was also responsible for approving half of all for-profit higher 
education institutions with major distance education programs. While evidence of 
accreditation shopping is anecdotal and inconclusive, patterns of institutional location 
decision-making suggest the need for further examination (Kinser, 2005). 
Determinants of Location Decisions 
Research on location decisions in manufacturing, service, retail and technology 
sectors of private business is copious. It is imperative to distinguish 
between locations and sites. Locations are larger geographic areas such as countries, 
states, regions, counties or cities that encompass a multitude of potential sites for 
businesses and other organizations (depending on the type of business conducted at the 
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site). Sites are specific plots of land, office space, etc. located within cities, counties, 
regions, states and/or countries. Location decisions are typically made as precursors to 
the selection of a site, which is a second-order decision (Milward & Newman, 1989). It 
is assumed in this study that for-profit higher education institutions in the US consider a 
number of state-level governance factors, such as higher education governance and 
regulation, when indentifying potential campus sites. For example, when electing to 
establish a site in Virginia Beach, VA, the University of Phoenix takes into account the 
state higher education regulatory requirements as well as the impact of obtaining SACS 
accreditation. 
The location decision literature outlines various determinants of business 
location decisions (Bartik, 1985 & 1988; Dawkins, 2003; Feiock & Stream, 2001; 
McQuaid et al, 2004; Tole & Koop, 2009; Watson, 2009; Zucker et al, 1998). Downes 
and Greenstein (1996, 2002) identified a number of factors that influence the location 
decisions of new entrants. Some factors include the presence and quality of competitors, 
closure habits of competitors, and family income levels within proximity to the 
prospective location. Other studies on business location decision-making cite skill level 
of the labor force, taxation, and uncertainty as determinants. 
Location theory is typically examined in the context of more traditional 
businesses such as manufacturing, service and foreign direct investment (FDI). One 
challenge of using location theory in identifying determinants that influence FPHIEDs is 
the assumption that firms select only one optimal location among many locations. 
Historically location decision theory assumes that firms are only able to choose location 
and site within which to locate their respective business operations (Bartik, 1985 & 
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1988). For-profit higher education institutions, however, select a number of locations 
and a number of sites within each location in which to operate. Another constraint is the 
assumption that there are huge costs associated with relocation of business operations or 
the establishment of new branches in different locations. FPHIEDs violate this 
assumption. They often operate within existing office parks or buildings. Utilizing pre-
existing and developed sites minimizes relocation costs for for-profit higher education 
institutions. 
Governance Factors 
The literature regarding the regulatory influences of private economic 
development has historically supported the view that greater regulations decrease 
economic development. Feiock and Stream (2001) posit that ".. .utility-maximizing 
firms will make investment and location choices based on anticipated profit earned on 
those investments" (p. 314). To that end, policy-makers are ".. .confronted with choices 
between protecting their citizens.. .through regulatory actions and promoting economic 
growth and development" (Feiock & Stream, 2001, p. 313). Jeong and Feiock (2006) 
assert that compliance with regulatory requirements is related to increased costs to 
businesses. Those higher costs limit economic development by decreasing profitability. 
State Higher Education Agency Governance Structure. The structure and 
political stability of governance structures are important to the location decisions of 
multinational firms and FDI (Korbin, 1979). While governance structure variation 
among states in the US is not as extreme as it is in other countries and/or regions, it is 
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still weighty. The few studies that examine state and/or federal higher education 
governance provide rationale for inclusion in this study. 
State Higher Education Regulatory Characteristics. Much of the early literature 
suggests that regulation impedes economic growth and development. More recently, 
however, there has been no consensus across the empirical research (Harris, 2001). The 
empirical findings of the Jeong and Feiock (2006) study conclude that there is a "false 
trade-off between regulation and economic growth (p. 760). Regulations that reduce 
firm uncertainty actually increase for-profit investment and economic development 
(Feiock & Stream, 2001; Henisz & Delios, 2001). Their findings are consistent with 
other empirical research on the impact of regulation and local economic development 
(Nelson & Moody, 2003, as cited in Jeong & Feiock, 2006). 
The regulatory environment impacts economic development negatively by 
imposing additional costs to firms and positively by reducing uncertainty. It is not clear 
how influential the regulatory environment is on locations decisions. Holt, Purcell, Gray 
and Pedersen (2006) contend that attractive regulatory environments were found to be 
low priorities in the location decision-making process of service sector firms. The low 
priority may be attributed to the fact that service sector firms do not rely heavily on 
regulatory compliance as a major part of operations, unlike other businesses and higher 
education institutions. Tole and Koop (2009) found similarly that environmental 
regulations did not affect the location decisions of multinational gold mining firms. 
34 
Regional Accreditation in US Higher Education. Accreditation is another aspect 
of the higher education regulatory environment that is posited to influence the 
prevalence of FPHIEDs across the US. At the federal level, adherence to higher 
education regulations is important for two reasons. First, in higher education regulatory 
compliance is considered a badge of quality. Satisfying the peer-review process of 
regional or national accreditation communicates a standard of quality in accredited 
higher education institutions. Ruch (2001) asserts that for-profits regard accreditation as 
essential for the operation of their business. Meeting or exceeding accreditation 
standards increases their "respectability" in the higher education community (p. 4). 
Second, regulatory compliance also provides access to Title IV federal student aid funds. 
Colleges and universities accredited by US DOE recognized agencies become eligible to 
receive billions of federal student aid dollars. 
Demographic Factors 
Demographic variables assist in examining governance and policy. In most 
empirical research, demographics are used to describe various aspects of certain 
populations. They also provide controls in the isolation of other intervening variables, 
which is how they are used in this study. 
Population. Khalil, Ellaboudy and Denzau (2007) found population density 
positively correlated with economic growth. These findings are intuitive, as larger 
populations increase the possibility of demand of products and services. Population is 
used as a control variable in location studies primarily because population centers are 
widely accepted as drivers for the location of businesses and industry (Brown, 1979). 
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The presence of more people also suggests the likelihood of more disposable income in 
a targeted geographic area. 
Median Family Income. Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) found that 
entrants into the private secondary school market are less likely to locate in communities 
in which a larger fraction of the families have low-incomes [incomes below $10,000 (in 
1980 dollars)]. Private secondary schools are more likely to locate in communities in 
which a larger fraction of families have incomes in excess of $50,000. Areas with 
higher levels of income create more opportunities for increasing revenues for for-profit 
entities. However, as median family income increases so does educational attainment, 
which suggests the possibility of fewer consumers of the for-profit higher education 
product. Essentially, locations with higher income levels have more people who have 
earned college degrees and, therefore, fewer people seeking to earn college degrees. 
Demand Factors 
Demand for public schools proves to be an important determinant of location 
choice for entering K-12 private schools (Downes & Greenstein, 2002). The authors 
found that new entrants will locate in a district when incumbents exit the market after 
the previous academic year (p. 363). New private schools enter the market based on the 
belief that they can fill the gap in demand in the market. It is this same logic that 
influences the location decisions of for-profit higher education institutions leading to the 
consideration of three demand variables for higher education. First to be examined are 
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unemployment rates, then MSA educational attainment levels followed by racial 
composition and rates of corporate taxation. 
Unemployment Rates. Many researchers theorize that US higher education 
enrollments increase as unemployment rates increase considering "... attending college 
can serve as a substitute for entering the workforce" (Heller, 1999, p. 87). Higher 
education practitioners agree and make preparations for increased enrollments when 
economic forecasts of high unemployment rates are received. Not all theorists agree, 
however. Some higher education and economic theorists argue that the lack of 
employment opportunities stifle the ability of the students and families to afford to pay 
for higher education. This study considers the impact of unemployment rates on the 
demand for for-profit higher education institutions. 
Educational Attainment. Labor is considered a key factor in the location 
decisions of businesses and firms (Harris, 2001; Hoke,1998; McQuaid et al, 2004). 
Educational attainment, however, can serve as a proxy for skill level of the labor force. 
Hoke (1998) found in his study of the impact of educational attainment on location 
decisions that educational attainment was linked to the perceived skill level of the 
workforce. Educational attainment was found to be a determinant of location decisions 
of transportation firms but not for the electronics equipment industry. These results are 
reportedly due to the nature of the work performed in the transportation industry which 
requires more skill than the electronics equipment industry. The author suggests that 
states wishing to attract certain businesses should promote higher education for the well 
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being of its residents and for the economy of the state. Harris (2001) asserts that 
businesses determine the quality of a regional labor force based on the presence of 
colleges and universities and their involvement in the enhancement of regional 
workforce skill levels. 
McQuaid et al (2004) found that skilled labor was more significant to business 
location decisions than transportation factors. McQuaid et al (2004) cited Cushman and 
Wakefield's (2002) study and three additional studies that found the availability of 
qualified staff was the single most important factor in deciding where to locate based on 
the views of senior executives from over 500 European companies. This finding is 
consistent with other research that suggests businesses seriously consider location 
decisions in areas closer to pools of qualified workers (Dawkins, 2003; Downes & 
Greenstein, 2002; McQuaid et al, 2004). Holt, Purcell, Gray and Pedersen (2006) 
studied the decision factors that influence the location decisions of regional headquarters 
(RHQ) of multinational enterprises. They found the availability of highly skilled staff 
ranked high among decision variables associated with RHQ location decision-making. 
Racial Composition. While the literature is limited on the impact of racial and 
age composition of the population on location decisions, the research on for-profit 
higher education institutions consistently indicates for-profit colleges and universities 
enroll a large number of minority and non-traditional aged students (Foster, 2004; GAO, 
2009; Ruch, 2001). Ruch (2001) attributes high minority enrollments in for-profit 
higher education institutions, in part, to the ".. .location of the schools in population 
centers" (p. 72). It is unclear whether the location is a cause of high minority 
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enrollments in for-profit colleges and universities or if a high population of minorities is 
one of the determinants of the location decisions of for-profit higher education 
institutions. Dawkins (2003) reported that firms will locate relatively close to local 
demand in an effort to minimize costs, including transportation costs, and maximize 
profitability. Minorities and non-traditional aged college students serve as an under-
tapped and devalued market in the higher education industry, therefore resulting in a 
market ripe with demand for the higher education product. 
Taxation. Taxation as a policy mechanism has historically been considered one 
of the primary factors of for-profit location decisions. The literature on taxation as a 
determinant of for-profit location decisions is extensive in the areas of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), multinational enterprises (MNE), and manufacturing plants. Tax 
incentives are one of the predominantly used methods of policy-makers to influence 
location decisions. More recent empirical studies have found taxation much less 
important to location decision-makers when determining the best location for a business 
than to policy-makers as a tool to recruit businesses (Elgar & Miller, 2010; Holt, Purcell, 
Gray & Pedersen, 2006; Kimelberg, 2010). These studies suggest that policy makers 
should consider other mechanisms for recruiting businesses. Because taxation has 
exhibited inconsistent findings related to its impact on business location decisions, it is 
included as a variable in this study. 
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Determinants Excluded from Consideration 
The factors under consideration in this study are not exhaustive according to the 
literature on business location decisions and for-profit higher education. Location 
theory suggests that other variables influence location decision-making of businesses 
such as elements of the political environment (risk and uncertainty, and political 
institutions and economic development) (Korbin, 1979), transportation and labor costs 
(Predohl, 1928; McQuaid et al, 2004), and bandwagon effects (Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
In addition, two higher education factors may influence the location behaviors of 
FPHIEDs: regional accreditation and state higher education spending. This section 
examines the literature related to these determinants, as well as the justification for their 
exclusion from this study. 
Political Risk and Uncertainty. The assessment of political culture is an 
important part of the location decision-making process for many for-profit entities 
around the world (Korbin, 1979). The results of political risk evaluation can make or 
break a location decision for domestic, international and/or multinational firms (MNF). 
Korbin (1979) defines political risk as: 1) ".. .an implication of unwanted consequences 
of political activity...," or 2) ".. .possible occurrence of a political event of any kind at 
home or abroad that can cause a loss of profit potential and/or assets..." (p. 67-68). 
Another aspect of political risk is changes in political and legislative control. Millett 
(1970) claims that in the US, governors serve as a source of higher education policy 
development. In addition, McLendon et al (2007) hypothesizes newly claimed control 
in the state legislature following a period of divided control would likely result in higher 
education governance reforms. For example, when one party controls the entire 
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legislative process, compromise and stability are more readily attainable. McClendon et 
al's (2007) event history analysis of 49 states over 15 years (1985-2000) found changes 
in state political landscapes as the primary driver of governance reform in state higher 
education. While the McLendon et al (2007) study does not address the relationship of 
higher education governance reform to location decisions, previous studies on location 
decision-making infer that changes in political control adversely impact decisions to 
locate within that municipality, city, state or country. 
Uncertainty pertains to ambiguity of the municipal policies and regulations. 
Municipal development processes can pose significant challenges to firms and service 
providers (Kimelberg, 2010, p. 94) because the transaction costs associated with the 
agency approvals can hamper investment (Jeong & Feiock, 2006) and location decisions 
(Kimelberg, 2010). One of the reasons for the need to minimize or eliminate uncertainty 
is to maximize profitability. High transaction costs result in lower profitability, and 
therefore, undermine economic growth and investment. Henisz and Delios (2001) claim 
".. .an organization must successfully counter uncertainty surrounding the governance of 
transactions in new markets to reap the desired benefits of higher profitability, growth, 
or survival" (p. 444). 
Uncertainty, as a determinant of location decisions, has been studied particularly 
in the context of multinational firms and FDI. Managers of these types of organizations 
make decisions dominated by limited information, risk aversion and uncertainty 
(Buckley, Devinney & Louciere, 2007, p. 1070). Kimelberg (2010) states that 
organization theorists are concerned with uncertainty and risk aversion since "Thompson 
(1967, as cited in Kimelberg, 2010) argued that organizations behave in ways that 
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attempt to reduce uncertainty in their operating environments..." (p. 88). In fact, policy 
uncertainty directly influences the location decisions of a firm or business, according to 
Henisz and Delios (2001). Richardson (1969) agrees suggesting risk reduction over 
profit maximization is a technique used by location decision-makers to ensure the long-
term survival of the firm (as cited in Harris, 2001). Kimelberg (2010) found that 
minimizing or eliminating uncertainty ranks higher than tax incentives and decreasing 
land costs among factors that influence location decisions. For international firms, 
Henisz and Delios (2001) found strong and consistent support that policy uncertainty in 
a host country negatively influences the likelihood of a plant location. There reason is 
firms desire to avoid investment in markets with high levels of policy uncertainty. 
One of the ways in which for-profit higher education can minimize risk and 
uncertainty is to obtain accreditation from US DOE approved agencies. Accomplishing 
this task provides access to guaranteed payments for tuition and fees of qualified 
students through the Title IV federal student aid programs. Addressing uncertainty by 
achieving US DOE approved accreditation allows for its effects to be captured by the 
regional accrediting agency variable because obtaining accreditation reduces uncertainty 
in the higher education sector. 
Political Institutions and Economic Development. In an annotated bibliography 
of the theoretical literature on economic growth Dawkins (2003) examined the 
conceptual foundations and recent developments in the field of economic development. 
Dawkins (2003) states "Ignoring the role of politics and political institutions in 
economic development is a substantial weakness of existing economic development 
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theory" (p. 146). The empirical study by Wu and Zhang (2007) supports Dawkins's 
(2003) assertion. Wu and Zhang (2007) found that city governments adopt policies and 
various other entrepreneurial measures to promote economic growth. Jeong and Feiock 
(2006), in their study of county instituted impact fees, contend that political institutions 
at the county level have only modest effects on economic development. 
Feiock and Stream (2001) assert government policy is important in for-profit 
location decision-making in a state within a particular region. This assertion is 
consistent with the Henisz and Delios (2001) study examining the location decisions of 
Japanese multinational enterprises from 1990-1996. The capacity of government to 
minimize or eliminate uncertainty over future policy regimes substantially influences 
location decisions, and, therefore, economic development in that area (Henisz & Delios, 
2001). The political institutions in the US are stable which alleviates concerns about 
uncertainty and policy regimes. For this reason, the stability of the political 
environment in US states is excluded from considerations in this study. 
Transportation. Transportation costs have been historically linked to business 
location decision-making as seen in the 19th and early 20th century work of German 
economists (Predohl, 1928). Predominantly the impact of transportation was 
investigated in the context of manufacturing firms, and was consistently considered a 
central determinant. Since that time location theory has consistently echoed the 
importance of transportation to location decisions. Transportation of inputs and outputs 
are important in determining where firms and plants locate, which is related to firms 
only selecting one optimal location among many options (Brown, 1979). It assumes that 
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inputs are purchased at one site, outputs are transported to the consumption site and 
firms are established in the best possible location in order to minimize costs associated 
with both (Brown, 1979). 
The growth and expansion of production, shipping and other technologies serve 
to mitigate the importance and influence of transportation on business location 
decisions. McQuaid et al's (2004) investigation of the importance of transportation 
factors in the location decisions of businesses found transportation less significant to 
business location decisions than other factors such as skill level of the labor force. 
FPHIEDs typically situate close to highways and interstates, suggesting the importance 
of selecting a final site within a city or region in convenient locations in close proximity 
to transportation outlets that is most convenient (Bailey, Badway & Gumport, 2001; 
Floyd, 2005; Morey, 2001 & 2004). For this reason, FPHIEDs incur only minimal 
transportation costs. In fact, transportation costs are incurred primarily by employees 
and consumers (students). Additionally, the use of technology to deliver the higher 
education product to distance education students virtually eliminates transportation costs 
to FPHIEDs. The negligible transportation costs to for-profit higher education 
institutions are justification for eliminating transportation as a determinant in this study. 
Labor Costs. Labor costs influence the location decisions of businesses 
(Buckley, Devinney &Louviere, 2007; McQuaid et al, 2004). This is especially true for 
those firms that rely heavily on labor in the production of their outputs. In 
manufacturing and service firms labor costs are associated with unionization, insurance 
and retirement benefits. Higher education institutions, overall, do not rely as heavily on 
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labor as manufacturing and service firms. Therefore, labor costs are excluded from 
consideration in this study. 
Bandwagon Effects. The behavior of competitors in the marketplace has long 
been considered important to business decision-makers. Competitors' behaviors 
including, but not limited to, pricing and location decisions, are considered to be 
bandwagon effects when those behaviors are used in the decision-making process of 
other firms in the market and/or geographic region. Henisz and Delios (2001) state that 
firms locating in a country were more likely to emulate the previous location decisions 
of firms from their respective home-country. The authors argue ".. .as a large number of 
peer organizations engage in a decision, it becomes common practice, or a rule of 
thumb, to implement the same decision" (Henisz & Delios, 2001, p. 444). Various 
studies of private, public and non-profit sectors support this finding (Chung & Alcacer, 
2002; Dawkins, 2003; Downes & Greenstein, 1996 & 2002; McLendon et al, 2007). In 
the Downes and Greenstein (2002) study, private K-12 schools in California were more 
likely to locate close to incumbent private schools of the same type. 
Higher education literature suggests that FPHIEDs recruit markets under-tapped 
by traditional higher education institutions such as minorities and working adults with 
children (Kelly, 2001). Non-profit higher education institutions are thought to ignore 
these populations, while FPHIEDs target them. Consequently, the prevalence of non-
profit higher education institutions is not expected to impact the location behavior of 
FPHIEDs. Therefore, the number of non-profit higher education institutions was 
excluded from this study. 
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State Higher Education Spending. Another aspect of political influence that 
impacts location decisions is governmental funding. Government expenditures are 
positively correlated with economic growth (Khalil, Ellaboudy & Denzaou, 2007). The 
amount of money a city, state or national government invests in economic growth is 
expected to correspond with economic return. It is the anticipated positive correlation 
between government spending and economic growth that spurred the recent federal 
economic recovery spending in the US from 2009 to the present. Elevated levels of state 
spending on higher education may encourage FPHIEDs to locate because access to state 
higher education funds increase an institution's guaranteed revenues. The limited 
number of states (N=3) that extend access of state higher education funding to for-profit 
higher education institutions justifies its exclusion from consideration this study. 
Chapter Summary 
A review of the literature reveals several determinants of location decisions 
specific to private and for-profit entities. Included determinants are regulatory 
characteristics, population, median family income, education attainment of the 
population, taxation, political risk and uncertainty, among others. While not all factors 
in this review are directly studied in the context of for-profit higher education 
institutions, they are applied to for-profit higher education because of the similarity of 
profit motivations of all for-profit businesses. Some factors are excluded from this 
study. The excluded factors are political risk, uncertainty, political institutions, 
transportation, bandwagon effects and state higher education spending. They are 
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eliminated from consideration either because they are outside the scope of this research 




The methodology employed in this study is outlined in this chapter. Following 
the introduction is a description of the research setting. Then the research design is 
discussed. Next, data collection techniques are detailed followed by variable definitions. 
The final section of the chapter addresses the data analysis. 
Introduction 
This research examines the higher education regulatory environment and its 
impact on for-profit higher education institutions. As the literature review in the 
previous chapter has shown, limited examination of the impact of governance on 
FPHIEDs has taken place. The literature on for-profit higher education has focused on 
programmatic quality and accountability for use of public funds. This study therefore 
adds to the public administration, higher education and economic development literature 
as to which higher education governance factors impact the behavior of for-profit higher 
education institutions. The study is designed to answer the following research question: 
What higher education governance factors influence the presence of 4-year, degree-
granting FPHIEDs in the US? Data for this study originate from pre-existing sources, 
including government databases, and primary qualitative data compiled by the author. 
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) serve as the unit of analysis for this study. 
The OMB defines MSAs as geographic entities that contain a core urban area of 50,000 
or more population (US Census, 2010). Each MSA consists of one or more counties and 
includes the counties containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties 
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that have a high degree of social and economic integration (as measured by commuting 
to work) with the urban core. MSAs are used in compiling, tabulating and publishing 
federal statistics. Use of MSAs as the unit of analysis accounts for regional level market 
forces that have been found to impact business decision-making (Brown, 1979; Predohl, 
1928). The location decision literature often employs institution-level analysis. It is 
currently not feasible to conduct institutional-level research on the higher education 
governance factors that influence FPHIED location decisions in this study. For-profit 
higher education decision-makers are often dispersed or unavailable. The inaccessibility 
of FPHIED decision-makers results from organization restructuring, acquisitions and 
mergers. Greater knowledge of for-profit higher education decision-making and the 
environment is needed. This study of the higher education regulatory environment seeks 
to meet that need. 
Research Setting 
The current higher education environment in the US is comprised of over 6,500 
degree-granting colleges and universities that provide education after high school (US 
DOE, 2009). It includes public, private nonprofit and for-profit institutions. At the time 
of this study, degree-granting for-profit higher education institutions make up over 1,100 
including 2- and 4-year institutions (NCES, 2009). This total does not include trade 
schools such as medical technology schools, cosmetology schools, etc. that award 
certificates. Only 4-year, degree-granting for-profit higher education institutions and 
their branch campuses are examined in this study because of the manageability of the 
population size (N>530). Branch campuses are included because they are more 
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responsive to differences across states and regulations are typically more stringently 
applied to branches (Bartik, 1988). In addition, branch campuses do not automatically 
carry the regional accreditation of the home institution. Therefore branch campuses may 
be sensitive to the regulatory requirements of the regional accrediting agencies with 
jurisdiction over their respective states. 
In the past five years higher education reform efforts were undertaken at the 
national and state levels. These modifications have limited the profitability of for-
profits that occurs at the expense of misinformed students, the non-profit higher 
education industry, and the public. For example, FPHIED accessibility to state and 
federal funds has been restricted. Federal legislation has been enacted to strengthen 
requirements of for-profit higher education institutions pertaining to graduation rates and 
loan default rates (US DOE, 2010). 
In addition to higher education reform efforts, accreditation of FPHIEDs has 
been scrutinized (US DOE, 2010). Higher education institutions in the US are not 
required to obtain accreditation of their academic or training programs, but accreditation 
is available. In fact, there are numerous accreditation agencies with jurisdiction at the 
national, regional, state and local levels. Some agencies are more credible than others. 
Measures of agency quality are related to the number and/or depth of quality standards, 
period reviews and site visits. Credible agencies are considered to be those recognized 
by the US Department of Education including the regional accrediting agencies 
discussed in Chapter 2. For-profit higher education institutions under study in this 
research have a plethora of accreditation options but relatively few credible alternatives. 
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The majority of the secondary data in this study are from 2009; however some 
data are from 2000 and 2007 because of the lack of available 2009 data for specific 
variables at the MSA level. For example, high school/GED completion rates are taken 
from 2000, while median family income data are used from 2007. 
Research Design 
The research design for this study calls for both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection, and quantitative data analysis. Two approaches to mixed methods research 
are combined to create the mixed-model exploratory design, variable development 
(MMED-VD) model: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie's (2004) mixed model design and 
Creswell and Piano Clark's (2007) exploratory design instrument development model. 
In the MMED-VD model, the researcher ".. .mix[es] qualitative and quantitative 
approaches within and/or across stages of research" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 
19). This research design mixes both approaches during the data collection phase. In 
the early stages of this study linear regression analysis was attempted. However, failure 
of the data to meet the assumptions of both multiple linear regression and Poisson 
regression resulted in the use of an alternative technique: ordinal logistic regression. 
The schematic for the MMED-VD model is displayed in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Note: Adapted from Johnson and Onwuegbuzie's (2004) mixed-model design and 
Creswell and Piano Clark's (2007) exploratory design instrument (variable) 
development model. 
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Data was collected sequentially, with the qualitative data (documents 
review/text) collected and analyzed first as outlined by Creswell and Piano Clark (2007). 
Resultant analysis identified themes related to elements of the regulatory characteristics 
exhibited by the state higher education agencies, which were then constructed into a 
quantitative variable with three levels: state HIED regulatory characteristics. 
Subsequent to the development of the state HIED regulatory characteristics variable was 
developed, it was included with all other quantitative data. Consequently, the qualitative 
and quantitative phases were connected during the quantitative data collection stage. 
Separately, the mixed method research approaches outlined by Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) and Creswell and Piano Clark (2007) are insufficient for this 
research. The Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) mixed-model design is limited in that it 
does not allow for the development of additional variables to be included in the stages of 
the research design. The Creswell and Piano Clark (2007) exploratory design 
instrument development model does not prohibit the possibility of including a newly 
identified or developed variable. According to Creswell and Piano Clark (2007), 
researchers who use this approach ".. .build on the results of the qualitative phase by 
developing an instrument, indentifying variables or stating propositions for testing..." 
(p. 77). Therefore, both approaches are combined to allow for the inclusion of the newly 
developed state higher education regulatory characteristic variable. It is one among 
many variables tested and analyzed in this study. 
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Data Collection 
Secondary data are collected from the US Census, National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES), Bureau of Economic Analysis (2009), Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Higher Education 
Accreditation (CHEA) from 2000, 2007, and 2009, respectively which constitutes the 
most recent data available at the time of this study. In addition, primary qualitative data 
was collected from the websites of state higher education agencies for a previous study. 
As a result, state higher education regulatory characteristics were compiled and analyzed 
for themes. Categories were created as a result of the characteristics exhibited by the 
state higher education agencies. Each category was increasingly restrictive and coded 
from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating the absence of regulatory characteristics and 2 signifying 
the most restrictive characteristics exhibited by a state. Every subsequent grouping of 
characteristics carries the attributes of the previous category while adding one additional 
regulatory restriction. 
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) serve as the unit of analysis for this study. MSA 
level data are available for the dependent variable, number of FPHIEDs, and the 
demographic and demand variables, population, median family income, unemployment 
rates, educational attainment and racial composition. One of the benefits of using MSAs 
is that they are linked directly to US Census data sets that contain above-listed measures 
of the variables in this study. 
Another benefit of using MSA level data is the resultant number of possible 
cases of the dependent variable (N=374) versus the low number of cases (N=52) with 
using state level data. Based on preliminary estimates, 4-year, degree-granting 
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FPHIEDs in the US (N=530) are located in approximately 127 of 366 MSAs (34.7%). 
An additional benefit relates to location theorists' claim that the impacts of market 
forces are most useful when examined at the regional or local level, as opposed to the 
state level. They have long argued that regional or local market forces more heavily 
influence the location decisions of traditional business and industry (Brown, 1979; 
Predohl, 1928). MSA level data accounts for regional-level market forces, therefore 
sufficiently addressing this theoretical concern. 
One challenge to using MSA level data is the prevalence of MSAs that cross 
state borders (N=45). It is optimal to disaggregate multi-state MSAs (ie: DC-VA-MD-
WV) to county or city levels in order to demarcate the differences between state higher 
education governance structure, state higher education agency regulatory characteristics, 
and regional accreditation jurisdiction. The lack of available and accurate disaggregated 
data for the 293 resultant counties/cities prohibits that level of analysis. However, 
multi-state MSAs are included because their exclusion eliminates a considerable number 
of diverse MSAs with small and large populations and numbers of FPHIEDs. 
Analysis of missing data found Puerto Rico MSAs to be missing data in the 
dataset. Therefore, Puerto Rico is eliminated from consideration in this study, which 
decreases the total number of MSAs in the data set from 374 to 366. 
Variables: Definitions and Measurement 
A number of variables are included in the database for statistical analysis and 
discussed in the following "Dependent Variables" and "Independent Variables" sections. 
There is one dependent variable and nine independent variables. Of the nine 
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independent variables, three are higher education governance factors (variables of 
interest), two demographic variables, and four demand variables. Appendix B details 
the sources, original level of measurement and recoded values of all variables used in 
this study. 
Dependent Variable 
The determinants of for-profit location outcomes have been examined 
extensively since the early 1800s (Predohl, 1928). Surveys of decision-makers were 
conducted to determine the factors that influenced their decisions to locate new branches 
or relocate existing organizations (Elgar & Miller, 2010). In addition, a great deal of 
research utilizing quantitative analysis has been performed to identify the variables with 
statistically significant relationships to the location of the organization and/or branches. 
Units of analysis of location decision research includes the following: county (Sambidi 
& Harrison, 2006), economic regions of the US (Zucker, Darby & Brewer, 1998), US 
states (Bartik, 1985 & 1988), and regions created from groups of countries (Tole & 
Koop, 2009). While the location decision literature has examined a number of different 
units of analysis, this study uses MSAs as the unit of analysis. 
The dependent variable, the number of FPHIEDs, is observed at the MSA level 
in the US. The dependent variable was originally observed as count data, but recoded 
into the following categories: none, low and high number of for-profit higher education 
institutions in an MSA. While the "none" category indicates the absence of FPHIEDs in 
an MSA, the "low" category includes between 1 and 4 FPHIEDs, and the "high" 
category included 5 or more FPHIEDs in an MSA. Categorical cut-points are selected 
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because they approximate a more even distribution in the number of MSAs represented 
in each category of the dependent variable. The cut points for the number of for-profit 
higher education institutions in an MSA are detailed below in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
Dependent Variable Cut Points 
Variable None Low High 
Number of FPHIEDs 
in an MSA 
[FPHIED] 0 1-4 5+ 
Independent Variables 
State Higher Education Governance Factors. Governance theorists argue that 
governance involves institutions and processes that assist governments doing its job. 
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001), for example, define governance as the administration of 
laws, rules, decisions and practices that restrict, advise and facilitate the provision of 
public goods and services. Kettl (2002) describes governance as ".. .the way 
government gets its job done" (p. xi). Other theorists have a broader view and purport 
that governance constitutes the traditions, organizations and procedures that give voice 
to citizens, and determine issues of public concern. The governance variable in this 
study include those guidelines, rules and standards established to address issues of 
public concern related to higher education in the US. The primary issues of public 
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concern regarding FPHIEDs are quality, accountability and oversight. The state higher 
education variables examined are state higher education governance structure, state 
higher education regulatory characteristics, and regional accreditation agency, all of 
which are state-level variables. 
The strength and stability of the national political environment has been found to 
influence location decisions and business investment. State higher education 
governance structure is hypothesized to affect the establishment of FPHIEDs (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001; Jeong & Feiock, 2006; Kimelberg, 2010). State higher education agencies 
with no governance are coded as 0, coordinating board structures coded as 1, and 
governing board structures coded as 2. The governance structures of the higher 
education agencies in the states and DC are collected by the Council of Higher 
Education Accreditation (2009). 
Compliance with regulatory requirements increases costs to businesses, which 
negatively affect economic development (Feiock & Stream, 2001; Henisz & Delios, 
2001; Jeong & Feiock, 2006). A review of the websites of state higher education 
agencies in the US illustrates distinctive traits associated with their ability to restrict the 
operation of private and for-profit higher education institutions in their respective state. 
These data were compiled by the author in a previous study in 2009, and categories were 
collapsed to reduce the number of cells in the data analysis as suggested by Mertler and 
Vannatta (2005). The resultant categories are coded 0 for no regulatory characteristics, 
1 for states that require approval of FPHIEDs to operate in their respective state, and 2 
for those states that require US DOE approval. Category 2 is considered to be the most 
stringent state higher education regulatory characteristic. 
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Six regional accrediting agencies are authorized by the US DOE to accredit 
higher education institutions in the US. These agencies have jurisdiction over certain 
states. Each agency establishes its own standards and procedures for achieving 
accreditation. Because these standards are created autonomously, there is the perception 
of different standards across regional accrediting agencies (AAUP, 2007; Kinser, 2005; 
US DOE, 2010). Information regarding the jurisdiction and name of the regional 
accrediting agency is collected from the CHEA (2009). Dummy variables are created 
for each regional higher education accrediting agency. NCACS serves as the reference 
category because it is considered to be the most accommodating accrediting agencies 
towards FPHIEDs and virtual postsecondary institutions (Kinser, 2005). 
Demographic Factors. Numerous demographic factors are useful in data 
analysis and research, as they often serve as predictor variables. Higher education, 
business and economic development research suggest that population and income 
influence FPHIEDs. The measurement of population is straightforward, but the income 
variable is measured by median family income. This set of independent variables is 
used as control variables. Business and economic development literatures consider them 
to be confounding variables. Both variables are measured at the MSA level. 
Population is a driver of business location decision-making. Khalil, Ellaboudy 
and Denzau (2007) found that population density is positively correlated with economic 
growth. The number of people living in an MSA is collected by the US Census (2009). 
Population data are recoded into low and high categories. The low category represents 
MSAs with populations of less than one million, while the high category includes 
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populations of one million or more. The cut-points are selected based on education 
literature that delineates small and large metropolitan populations (Camburn, 1990; 
Larson & Fleishman, 2003). 
High levels of median family income increases the likelihood of more disposable 
income. Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) found that entrants into the private 
secondary school market are less likely to locate in communities with low-income 
families [incomes below $10,000 (in 1980 dollars)] and more likely to locate in 
communities higher incomes of $50,000 or more (Downes & Greenstein, 2002, p. 362). 
Locating in high income areas increases the opportunity for more sales and greater 
revenue. The income variable is measured by median family income calculated by the 
US Census (2009) at the MSA level in US dollars, adjusted for inflation. The median 
family income variable is recoded into low, medium and high categories according to 
tertile cut-points in the dataset. The low category includes median family income less 
than $52649, medium is $52650-$61069, and high is $61070 or greater. Tertile cut 
points are used for the remaining independent variables, excluding corporate taxation, 
which includes three equal groups in each respective category representing the low, 
medium and high (Dekker, Crow, Folsom, Hannan, Liao, Swenne & Schouten, 2000; 
Ferge, 2010; Reijneveld, Verheihj & Bakker, 2000). Table 3.2 below displays the cut 
points for both demographic variables. 
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Table 3.2 
Demographic Factor Cut Points 
Variable Low Medium High 
MSA Population 
[PopLMedH] <1,000,000 n/a >1,000,000 
MSA Median 
Family Income 
[MFIncLMedH] <$52649 $52650-$61069 >$61670 
Demand Factors. Demand, as defined in economics, is the desire to receive a 
good or service and the ability to pay for the good or service (Salvatore & Diulio, 1996). 
While higher education is an untraditional good or service, there is a desire to receive 
the product: academic degree. There is also the ability to pay for the degree as a result 
of access to Title IV federal student aid funds. The demand for FPHIEDs is marked by 
unprecedented growth in enrollment over the last 10 years when compared with 
traditional colleges and universities (Kelly, 2001). Demand for for-profit higher 
education is assumed to be a function of the percent of the population that is 
unemployed, the education level of the population, and the percent of minorities (non-
white) in the population. These factors are operationalized by unemployment rate, 
educational attainment (by levels of high school completion, college completion and 
graduate degree completion) and racial composition (percentage of Blacks in the MSA 
population), and corporate taxation (state corporate tax rate). Unemployment rate, 
educational attainment and racial composition are measured at the MSA level, while 
corporate taxation is measured at the state level because it is not available at the MSA 
level. 
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Unemployment is related to increased demand for higher education. The term 
unemployed is defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010) as those individuals 
without jobs but who are actively seeking employment and available to work. It is 
widely accepted among higher education scholars and practitioners that when people are 
out of work, higher education enrollments increase (Heller, 1999). Data for 
unemployment rates, which is defined as the percentage of the population that is 
unemployed, are collected from the US Census for the year 2009. It is recoded into 
equal low, medium and high categories with the following values represented in each 
respective category: <7.69%, 7.7%>-9.89%, and >9.9%. Categories are established based 
on cut-points similar to those utilized by Kahn (2010). 
Educational attainment has been shown to influence location decisions, 
particularly when serving as a proxy for skill level of the labor force. An extremely 
educated, and therefore perceivably highly skilled, labor force is an attractor to 
businesses and industry (Harris, 2001; Hoke, 1998; McQuaid et al, 2004). Educational 
attainment, however, is a detractor for the establishment of FPHIEDs because highly 
educated regions limit demand for the higher education product. Educational attainment 
is presented as a percentage of the population with various levels of educational 
completion including high school/GED completion, bachelor's degree completion and 
advanced degree completion. Rates of educational attainment at the MSA level are 
collected from the US Census Bureau (2009). Categories of low, medium and high 
tertile cut-points are <84.09%, 84.1%-87.69%, and >87.7% for high school/GED 
completion, <20.79%, 20.8%-27.49%, and >27.5%> for bachelor's completion, and 
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<7.09%, 7.1%-9.79%, and >9.8% for advanced degree completion. Table 3.3 below 
details the cut-points. 
The literature is limited on the impact of racial composition on location 
decisions. Research on FPHIEDs is consistent that for-profit colleges and universities 
enroll a large number of minority (non-white) students (Foster, 2004; GAO, 2009 & 
2010; Ruch, 2001). Percentage of Hispanic or Latin population is excluded because of 
the lack of available aggregated MSA level data. The percentage of Blacks living in 
each MSA is collected from the US Census (2009). Tertile cut-points used to create 
equal categories of low, medium and high percentages of Blacks in an MSA population 
are <3.52%, 3.53%-11.29%, and >11.3%, respectively. Below Table 3.3 displays the cut 
points for all demand variables except state corporate tax rates. 
Table 3.3 
Demand Factor Cut Points 
Variable Low Medium High 
MSA Unemployment Rate 
[UnemplLMedH] <7.69% 7.7%-8.89% >8.9% 
MSA High School/GED 
Completion Rate 
[HSComplLMedH] <84.09% 84.1%-87.69% >87.7% 
MSA Bachelor's Completion 
Rate 
[BAComplLMedH] <20.79% 20.8%-27.49% >27.5% 
MSA Advanced Degree 
Completion Rate 
[ADVComplLMedH <7.09% 7.1%-9.79% >9.8% 
Percent of Blacks in MSA 
Population 
[Blk09LMedH] <3.52% 3.53%-11.29% >11.3% 
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Corporate taxation is defined as the state corporate tax rate as outlined by OECD 
(2009). The state corporate tax rate variable includes two categories, below and above 
the national average for 2010 (10.4%). Below the national average is coded as <10.4% 
and above the national average is >10.4%. Comparisons of state data to national 
averages are consistent with the use and reporting of US governmental agencies such as 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) with unemployment rates, and job growth. State 
corporate tax rate cut-points are selected because they allow for ease of comparison to 
the national corporate tax rate average. Cut-points for state corporate tax are displayed 
below in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
State Corporate Tax Rate Cut Points 
Variable Below Above 
State Corporate Tax Rate 
[TaxAbvBel] £10.4% >10.4% 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative data from the content analysis of websites, online documents, and 
publications from the state higher education agencies of the fifty states and DC (N=51) 
were transformed into an ordinal-level quantitative variable, state higher education 
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regulatory characteristics, in a previous study. All quantitative data, including the 
transformed variable, were entered into a database using Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) program, version 17.0. Basic frequencies, calculation of means, 
crosstabs were performed to provide a descriptive account of the data. Puerto Rico 
MSAs contributed to a large amount of missing data; therefore Puerto Rico was 
eliminated from the dataset and subsequent analysis. 
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Qualitative Analyses 
Content analysis was conducted on the websites of all states and DC higher 
education agency websites from January 2009 through March 2009. Appendix C details 
the state higher education agencies accessed to compile the raw qualitative data. 
Qualitative data was coded and compared to identify themes across concepts. Themes 
related to state higher education regulatory characteristics emerged from the data. The 
state higher education regulatory characteristics construct was identified. Policy 
characteristics were grouped together to form three distinct categories. The three 
categories were operationalized into the quantitative variable state HIED regulatory 
characteristics. Below the qualitative data analysis procedures are outlined. 
Step 1: Assign 1 point to each regulatory characteristic exhibited by each 
state higher education agency. 
Step 2: Total the scores for each state higher education agency. (Note: 
values ranged from 0 [no restrictions] to 3 [highly restrictive].) 
Step 3: Assign values to regulatory characteristics based on the scores 
totals from Step 2 - 0 (no restrictions), 1 (minor to no 
restrictions), 2 (some restrictions), and 3 (highly restrictive). 
Step 4: Collapse groups 0 and 1 into a single group (0), renumber group 2 
into 1, and group 3 into 2. 
Below Table 3.5 details the coding, regulatory characteristics and operational definitions 
for the categories of state higher education regulatory characteristics. 
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Table 3.5 
Operational Definitions and Coding Rubric for State HIED Regulatory 
Characteristics 
Coding State HIED Regulatory Operational Definition 
Characteristics 
0 None or Registration Only No restrictions of FPHIEDs ability 
to operate within the state 
1 Ability to Restrict: Registration Agency approval required without 
and State Agency Approval USDOE accreditation for 
FPHIEDs to operate in the state 
2 Ability to Restrict: Registration, Agency approval required with 
State Agency Approval, and USDOE accreditation for 
USDOE Approved Accreditation FPHIEDs to operate in the state 
Chi-Square Tests 
Chi-square tests are conducted to evaluate the relationship between the 
dependent variable, none/low/high FPHIEDs, and the eight independent variables, some 
of which are categorized for simplicity of analysis. In chi-square analysis, the null 
hypotheses generate expected frequencies against which observed frequencies are tested. 
In the cases where observed and expected frequencies are similar, the value of x2 is small 
and the null hypotheses are accepted. Likewise, when the observed and expected 
frequencies are significantly different, the null hypotheses are rejected (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
The primary assumption associated with chi-square testing is that the expected 
value for each cell is five or higher. This assumption is violated by a number of 
variables in this study. Therefore, Fisher's exact test was employed for the variables 
that produced expected cells counts of five or less because the Fisher's exact test does 
not require a minimum expected cell count. 
67 
Ordinal Logistic Regression 
Regression is a widely-used type of analysis because it provides a 
straightforward estimation of the unknown parameter(s). Multiple regression ".. .allows 
for modeling and investigating the relationships between a response variable and a set of 
regressor variables" (Myers, Montgomery & Vining, 2002, p.7). A number of studies 
have used some form of regression analysis to identify the factors that impact business 
decisions (Bartik, 1985 & 1988; Carr, 2001; Chhatre, 2000; Chung & Alcacer, 2002; 
Feiock & Stream, 2001; Rentas, 2009; Tole & Koop, 2009). 
This research employs ordinal logistic regression (OLR) because of the 
categorical and ordered nature of the dependent variable, with three categories: none, 
low and high. OLR has its foundation in logistic regression which allows the prediction 
of a dichotomous outcome variable from continuous, discrete and/or dichotomous 
independent variables (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). OLR is 
used to identify the combination of predictor variables that best predicts membership 
into one of two or more categories of the numbers of FPHIEDs in an MSA 
(none/low/high). 
Logistic regression, and its varying forms, has no assumptions about the 
distribution of independent variables, therefore independent variables do not have to be 
normally distributed nor linear. In fact, logistic regression is extremely useful when one 
of the independent variables is nonlinear. There are no assumptions related to equality 
of variance, which means variance measurements can differ at varying measures of the 
dependent variable. 
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There are, however, assumptions associated with OLR. First is the assumption 
of adequate cases-to-variables. An acceptable case-to-independent variables ratio was 
met using the most conservative estimator, N= (50) + 8m, where N= the number of 
required cases of the dependent variable and m= the maximum number of independent 
variables used in the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). When m=35, then N=330, 
which is below the 366 cases of the dependent variable used in this study. 
A second assumption is the absence of multicollinearity, which exists when there 
are high correlations among predictor variables (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Checks for 
multicollinearity were performed by screening variables for high Pearson Correlation 
coefficients across all variables. Tolerance statistics were set at >.70. This constitutes 
an acceptable cut point for correlation tolerance based on similar research conducted by 
Reed, McGee, Yano and Kankin (1985). 
A third assumption of OLR pertains to the use of goodness-of-fit tests, such as 
chi-square tests for goodness-of-fit or Fisher's exact test. If cells of the expected 
frequencies are too small, statistical power may be compromised. Cross tabulations are 
conducted and analyzed for violations of this assumption. Analysis reveals cells with 
zero frequencies (63.9%), which is attributable to the considerable number of empty data 
points that results from the inclusion of multi-state MSAs in the dataset (N=46). The 
multi-state nature of these MSAs prohibits the input of state specific data such as state 
higher education governance structure, state higher education regulatory characteristics, 
regional accreditation and state corporate taxation, except where state data are the same 
across all states represented in the multi-state MSAs. 
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Fourth is the assumption that the responses of the dependent variable are 
independent of each other, which supposes that each response results from a different 
case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). A final assumption underlying OLR is that the 
relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same, called the proportional 
odds assumption or parallel regression assumption. This means that the coefficients that 
illustrate the relationship between none (lowest) versus "low" and "high" categories of 
the number of FPHIEDs in an MSA are the same as those that describe the relationship 
between the "low" category and all higher categories, etc. Because the relationship 
between all pairs of groups is expected to be the same, only one set of coefficients is 
reported (only one model). Failure to meet this assumption requires the analysis of 
different models (i.e., generalized ordered logit model) to describe the relationship 
between each pair of outcome groups. Subsequent tests of parallel lines confirm that 




Results of the quantitative analyses and the answers to the research question are 
provided in this chapter. The first section presents data screening and the second section 
summarizes the descriptive statistics. Then the bivariate results are outlined, followed 
by the multivariate results. A summary of the data analysis is discussed in the final 
section of the chapter. 
Data Screening 
Diagnostic analysis of the independent variables revealed the presence of 
multicollinearity among some independent variables. Most correlations between 
independent variables were within an acceptable range with tolerance statistics less than 
0.3 (Reed, McGee, Yano & Kankin, 1985). There were a total of three variables with 
Pearson correlations higher than or equal to 0.70: bachelor's degree completion to both 
advanced degree completion (r=.864, p<.001) and median family income (r=.716, 
p<.001). In order to correct for multicollinearity, median family income, advance 
degree completion and percent of Whites were deleted from the statistical analysis in the 
restricted ordinal logistic regression model but included in the full model for 
comparison. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Discussion of the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables is presented below. Additional descriptive statistics regarding the states and 
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MSAs with and without for-profit higher education institutions located within their 
respective boundaries are outlined as well. 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
There are 366 MSAs in the dataset. Of that, 46 MSAs comprise multiple states 
within the boundaries of the OMB defined MSA. The multi-state MSAs contain 293 
counties and/or cities, an average of approximately seven counties/cities each. Seven 
multi-state MSAs are comprised of only two counties that are located in two different 
states: Cumberland MD-WV, Fargo ND-MN, Grand Forks ND-MN, Lewiston ID-WA, 
Logan UT-ID, South Bend IN-MI, and Texarkana TX-AR. The multi-state MSA with 
the largest number of states and counties/cities is Washington DC-VA-MD-WV with 22 
counties/cities and four states. Table 4.1 below outlines the multi-state MSAs. 
Table 4.1 
Multi-State Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
MSA 
































































PA-NJ Metro Area 
GA-SC Metro Area 
MA-NH Metro Area 
MO-IL Metro Area 
NC-SC Metro Area 
TN-GA Metro Area 
IL-IN-WI Metro Area 
OH-KY-IN Metro Area 
TN-KY Metro Area 
GA-AL Metro Area 
MD-WV Metro Area 
IA-IL Metro Area 
MN-WI Metro Area 
IN-KY Metro Area 
ND-MN Metro Area 
AR-MO Metro Area 
AR-OK Metro Area 
ND-MN Metro Area 
MD-WV Metro Area 
WV-KY-OH Metro Area 
MO-KS Metro Area 
TN-VA Metro Area 
WI-MN Metro Area 
ID-WA Metro Area 
UT-ID Metro Area 
KY-IN Metro Area 
TN-MS-AR Metro Area 
MN-WI Metro Area 
NY-NJ-PA Metro Area 
NE-IA Metro Area 
WV-OH Metro Area 
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Table 4.1 (Cont'd) 
Multi-State Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
MSA 




39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River 
41140 St. Joseph 
41180 St. Louis 
43580 Sioux City 
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka 
45500 Texarkana 






WV-OH Metro Area 
PA-NJ-DE-MD Metro Area 
OR-WA Metro Area 
RI-MA Metro Area 
MO-KS Metro Area 
MO-IL Metro Area 
IA-NE-SD Metro Area 
IN-MI Metro Area 
TX-Texarkana AR-Metro 
VA-NC Metro Area 
DC-VA-MD-WV Metro 
Area 
WV-OH Metro Area 
WV-OH Metro Area 
VA-WV Metro Area 
OH-PA Metro Area 
For-Profit Higher Education Institutions [FPHIED]. There are 127 MSAs that 
house at least one 4-year, degree-granting for-profit higher education institution, which 
constitutes 34.6% of all MSAs. A total of 239 MSAs have no for-profit higher 
education institutions, 42 MSAs contain only one, and 4 comprise more than 20 for-
profit higher education institutions, with 26 FPHIEDs in the Los Angeles MSA. 
Higher Education Governance Factors 
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State Higher Education Governance Structure [HIEDGov]. State higher 
education governance structures are established at the state level. More than half 
(54.9%) of the states in the US, including DC (N=51), have governing boards (N=28). 
Coordinating bodies make up 43.1% or 22, and Michigan constitutes the remaining 
2.0%) with no state higher education governance structure. One hundred eighty four 
MSAs (54.9%o) are overseen by coordinating bodies, 121 MSAs (36.1%) are overseen by 
governing boards, and 14 (4.2%>) Michigan MSAs do not have a state higher education 
governing structure. There are 33 missing data points which include multi-state MSAs; 
however thirteen of the multi-state MSAs are included because the states within the 
respective MSA exhibit the same state HIED governance structure. 
State Higher Education Regulatory Characteristics [HIEDRegsl]'. The analysis 
is performed with state higher education regulatory characteristics 0 and 1 collapsed into 
one category because their respective characteristics constitute the same value of 
regulations: none. Of the collapsed categories 140 MSAs (43.1%) exhibit no 
regulations, while 107 (32.9%>) and 78 (24.0%>) require state agency approval and US 
DOE approval, respectively. Multi-state MSAs with varying state higher education 
regulatory characteristics account for the missing data points (N=41), while some multi-
state MSAs are included because the state higher education regulatory characteristic 
values are the same for all states within that MSA. Appendix D details the states, their 
respective higher education regulatory characteristics and governance structure. 
Appendix E outlines the original categories of the state higher education regulatory 
characteristics. 
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Regional Accrediting Agencies. The regional accrediting agency represented in 
the most MSAs is SACS with 123 (34.9%), followed by NCACS with 121 (34.3%), 
MSACS and NWCCU with 33 each (9.4%), WASC with 27 (7.7%) and NEACS with 15 
(4.3%). Multi-state MSAs with varying regional accrediting jurisdictions across states 
constitutes 14 missing data points for this variable. 
With regards to population, WASC is the regional accrediting agency with the 
highest mean 2009 population estimate per MSA within its jurisdiction at 1.371 million 
(s.d.=2,579,357), which is positively skewed by the population of the Los Angeles-Long 
Beach-Santa Ana CA MSA with more than 12 million people. Middle States, next 
largest with mean population estimates at more than 1.237 million (s.d.=3,391,339), is 
likewise skewed by the influence of the New York Northern New Jersey-Long Island 
NY-NJ-PA MSA with a 2009 population estimate that exceeds 19 million. The 
remaining accrediting agencies from largest to smallest mean populations are NEACS 
(842,743 and s.d.=l, 124,612), SACS (601,576 and s.d.=l,069,729), NCACS (533,073 
and s.d.=l,122,335), and NWCCU (467,719 and s.d.=720,721). 
Demographic Factors 
Population [PopLowHigh]. Based on 2009 population estimates from the US 
Census (2009), the smallest MSA is Carson City (Nevada) with 55,176, while the largest 
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is New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island MSA with 19,069,796. The average 
MSA population is 703,156 (s.d.=l,589,493.76). 
Median Family Income [MFIncLMedH]. The 2007 Median family income 
(adjusted for inflation) is collected from the US Census (2009), where the average MSA 
median family income is $57,803.96 (s.d.=9845.68). McAllen-Edinburg-Mission TX 
and Washington DC constitute the MSAs with the smallest and largest median family 
incomes, respectively at $30,000 and $97,095. The calculation of median family income 
is performed excluding missing MSA data from Cape Girardeau-Jackson MO-IL, 
Manhattan KS, and Mankato-North Mankato MN. 
Demand Factors 
Unemployment Rate [UmeplLMedH]. The average MSA unemployment rate for 
2009 is 9.15%) (US Census, 2009). The Bismarck, ND MSA has the lowest 
unemployment rate (2.80%) and El Centro CA has the highest (31.90%>). Missing MSA 
data from St. Louis MO, Davenport-Moline KS and Weirton-Steubenville WV-OH are 
not included in this analysis. 
Educational Attainment. Educational attainment is measured in three levels: 
completed high school/GED [HSCompLMedH] (2000), completed Bachelor's degree 
[BAComplLMedH] (2009), and completed Advanced degree [ADVComplLMedH] 
(2009). The average rate of educational attainment at each level are 85.2%> (s.d.=5.60), 
25.0% (s.d.=7.66), 9.1%> (s.d =3.79), respectively. MSAs with the lowest and highest 
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percentages among the three levels are McAllen-Edinburg-Mission TX (59.5%) and 
Lawrence KS (95.3%) for high school/GED, Hanford-Corcoran CA (11.5%) and 
Boulder CO (56.6%) for Bachelor's, and Hanford-Corcoran CA (3.2%) and Ithaca NY 
(27.7%o) for Advanced degrees. 
Racial Composition. The racial composition variable is the percent of the MSA 
population that includes Black/African Americans [Blk09LMedH]. The average percent 
of Blacks in the MSA population is 10.4%> (s.d =10.64). Lewiston IA-WA reports the 
lowest percent among MSAs at 0.1 %, while Augusta GA has the highest at 49.6%>. 
Percent of population of Hispanic or Latin origin is excluded due to the lack of available 
aggregated data at the MSA level. 
State Corporate Tax Rates [TaxAbvBel]. The average state corporate tax rates 
across all MSAs in 2009 is 6.54% (s.d.=2.46), while the ranges are 0.0% to 12.0%. 
Multi-state MSAs constitute the missing data points for this variable. Use of corporate 
taxation is cautioned because the data are compiled at the state level, therefore its 
resulting statistics are skewed towards states with a large number of MSAs such as 
California (25 MSAs and 8.84% tax rate), Texas (23 MSAs and 1.00%), Florida (19 
MSAs and 5.50%o) and Michigan (14 MSAs and 6.04%>). It is also important to note that 
the state of Washington's business and occupation gross receipts is converted into an 
effective corporate income tax rate and Texas' 1%> margins tax rate is included as if it is 
a traditional corporate income tax (OECD, 2009). Conversions of Washington and 
Texas tax rates are consistent with the practices of OECD (2009). As seen below, Table 
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4.2 below details the descriptive statistics for the original IVs before recoding. 




Descriptive Statistics for Continuous 
Variable 
Population [PopLowHigh] 
Median Family Income 
[MFIncLMedH] 












% Blacks in MSA Population 
[Blk09LMedH] 









































Frequencies for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable 















































































Table 4.3 (cont'd) 
Frequencies for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable 

























State Corporate Tax Rate 
[TaxAbvBel] 
Below National Average 














































Population [PopLowHigh]. Population is positively correlated with median 
family income (r=.366,^»<.001), and degree completion. Its association with degree 
completion at both levels is positive for bachelors and advanced degree completion, 
respectively, at (r=.332,j9<.001 and r=.322,^<.001). 
Median Family Income [MFIncLMedH]. Consistent with mature public 
administration and policy research, median family income is positively correlated with 
high school/GED completion (r=.504,/><.001), and bachelor's and advanced degree 
completion (r=.714,p<.001 and r=.625,p<.001, respectively). Median family income is 
negatively associated with MSA unemployment (r= -.177, /?<.001) and the percent of 
Black in the MSA population (r= -.136,/K.001). 
MSA Unemployment Rate [UnemplLMedH]. A number of variables are 
positively correlated with MSA unemployment rate including SACS (r=.109,/K.05), 
advanced degree completion (r=.284, /?<.001) and percent of Blacks in the MSA 
population (r=.240,£><.001). NWCCU (r=-.134,/?=.012), median family income (r=-
.177,/?<.001), high school/GED and bachelors degree completion (r=-.29,/?<.001 and 
r=-.317,/><.001, respectively) are negatively associated with MSA unemployment rates. 
Educational Attainment. All levels of educational attainment are positively 
associated with median family income, and negatively correlated with MSA 
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unemployment rate. These relationships are consistent with education and economic 
development research. The association of high school/GED completion is negative and 
insignificant, while bachelor's and advanced degree completion are negative and 
significant to population. 
Racial Composition [Blk09LMedH]. The percent of Blacks in an MSA 
population is negatively correlated with median family income (r= -.136,£><.001), high 
school/GED completion (r= -.314, /?<.001). It is positively associated with population 
(r=.247,/?<.001) and MSA unemployment rates (r= .240, /K.001). 
State Corporate Tax Rates [TaxAbvBel]. Positive associations are found 
between state corporate tax rates and median family income (r=.l 14,/?<.05) and high 
school/GED completion (r=.166,/K.001). Negative associations are found with state 
regulatory characteristics (r=-.140,/?<.05), MSA unemployment rates (r=-.152,/?<.001), 
and percent of Blacks in the MSA population (r=-. 152, p<.05). Table 4.4 below details 
the correlations between the dependent variable and selected independent variables in 
the data analysis. 
Table 4.4. 













MSA Population [PopLowHigh] .247 ** .366 ** .066 
MSA Unemployment Rate 
[UnemplLMedH] .066 
-.240 ** .177** 
HS/GED Completion Rates 
[HSCompLMedH] .053 -.314 ** .504 ** -.290** 
Bachelor's Completion Rates 
[BAComplLMedH] 










Correlation significant at .05 level (2-tailed) 




State Higher Education Governance Structure [HIEDGov]. In assessing 
differences across MSAs in the types of state higher education governance structure, 
particularly no governance structure, coordinating body, or governing board, a one-
sample chi-square test is conducted. The results of the test are significant, % (2, 
N=335)=144.79, /K.001. The proportion of the categories for this variable includes the 
following: P=38 for governing boards, P=.58 for coordinating bodies, and P=. 04 for 
MSAs with no governance structure. A follow-up test is also found to be statistically 
significantp<.00\, indicating statistically significant differences between the proportion 
of governing boards and coordinating bodies, x2(L N=144)=93.44,_p<.001, as well as 
MSAs with no state HIED governance, £{\, N=144)=11.59,p=.001. Table 4.5 below 
details the chi-square test results. 
Table 4.5 
Chi-Square Test for State HIED Governance Structure Variable 
Variable /^ df IV p value 
State High Education 
Governance 
Structure 
[HIEDGov] 144.79 2 335 0.000 
State Higher Education Regulatory Characteristics [HIEDRegsl]. A one-sample 
chi-square test is conducted and found statistically significant differences between the 
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state higher education regulatory characteristics across MSAs, x (1, N=335)=17.76, 
p<.00\. MSAs that with no regulatory characteristics represent P=.43 probability, while 
state approval and US DOE approval exhibit P=.33 and .24, respectively. A follow-up 
test found statistically significant differences between the none category and state 
approval, x2(L N=247)=4.41Sjp=04, and US DOE approval, x
2(l, N=247)=17.63,/><.01. 
Below Table 4.6 outlines the results of the chi-square test. 
Table 4.6 
Chi-Square Test for State HIED Regulatory Characteristics Variable 
Variable "£_ df N p value 
State Higher Education 
Regulatory Characteristics 
[HIEDRegsl] 17.76 2 325 <.001 
Higher Education Regional Accreditation Jurisdiction. Chi-square tests are 
conducted on five dummy variables of HIED regional accreditation jurisdiction: MSACS, 
NEACS, NWCCU, SACS and WASC. Each variable is compared to the remaining five 
variables. MSACS significantly differs from other regional accreditation variables, % (1, 
N=352)=232.38,/7<.001. NEACS is found to be significantly different from all other 
regional accrediting jurisdictions, x2(l, N=352)=294.56,/?<.001. Likewise, NWCCU, 
X2(l, N=352)=232.38,/?<.001, SACS, %\\, N=352)=31.92,p<.001, and WASC, x2(l, 
N=352)=252.28,/><.001, are all found to differ significantly from the other respective 
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jurisdictions. No follow-up tests are performed because each variable includes only two 
categories, therefore no follow-up is required. 
MSA Population [PopLowHigh]. A one-sample chi-square test is conducted to 
assess the differences across MSAs in the number of low and high categories of 
population. Results of the test are statistically significant, % (1, N=366)=l 87.55, p<.00\. 
The low category of population (less than one million) is P=.86, while the high category 
(one million or higher) is P=.l4. Table 4.7 below details the chi-square test results for 
MSA population. 
Table 4.7 
Chi-Square Test for MSA Population Variable 
Variable Ŷ  df N p value 
MSA Population 
[PopLowHigh] 187.55 1 366 <.001 
MSA Median Family Income [MFIncLMedH]. The differences found across low, 
medium and high categories of median family income are not significant, % (2, 
N=363)=.00, p=\ .00. A follow-up test was not conducted because the chi-square tests 
was not significant. Below Table 4.8 outlines the results of the chi-square test. 
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Table 4.8 
Chi-Square Test for MSA Median Family Income Variable 
Variable x2 df N p value 
MSA Median Family 
Income 
[MFIncLMedH] .00 2 363 1.00 
MSA Unemployment Rate [UnemplLMedH]. A one-sample chi-square test is 
conducted to assess the differences in low, medium and high rates of unemployment 
across MSAs. The differences are not found to be statistically significant, x2(2, 
N=363)=.446,/?=.80, therefore a follow-up test was not conducted. Below the chi-square 
tests for MSA unemployment rates are displayed in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 
Chi-Square Test for MSA Unemployment Rate Variable 
Variable x2 df N p value 
MSA Unemployment Rate 
[UnemplLMedH] 36.15 2 363 <.001 
Educational Attainment. A one-sample chi-square test is conducted to assess the 
differences in low, medium and high rates of high school/GED completion across MSAs. 
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The differences are not statistically significant, x (2, N=366)=.049,p=.976. For low, 
medium and high rates of bachelor's degree completion, chi-square tests are conducted 
and differences are found to be significant, % (2, N=366)=.049, p=.976. Chi-square tests 
are conducted for low, medium and high rates of advanced degree completion. The 
differences found in advanced degree completion are not significant, x (2, N=366)=.049, 
p=.976. Lack of significance in the chi-square tests for all levels of educational 
attainment results in no follow-up test conducted. Below the chi-square tests for all 
levels of education attainment are presented in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 
Chi-Square Tests for High School/GED & Bachelors Completion Variables 
Variable x̂  df N p value 
MSA High School/GED 
Completion Rate 
[HSCompLMedH] .049 2 366 .976 
MSA Bachelor's Degree 
Completion Rate 
[BAComplLMedH] .049 2 366 .976 
MSA Advanced Degree 
Completion Rate 
[ADVComplLMedH] .049 2 366 .976 
Percent of Blacks in MSA Population. The result of the chi-square test to 
determine the differences between low, medium and high rates of Blacks in MSA 
populations are not statistically significant, x2(2, N=366)=. 016,/?=992. No follow-up 
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was conducted because the chi-square test results are not significant. Table 4.11 below 
details the chi-square results for the percent of Blacks in an MSA. 
Table 4.11 
Chi-Square Test for Percent Blacks in MSA Variable 
Variable Y/ df N p value 
Percent Blacks in MSA 
[Blk09LMedH] .016 2 366 .992 
State Corporate Tax Rates. A one-sample chi-square test is conducted to assess 
the differences among state corporate tax rates that are below or above the national 
average corporate tax rate. The results of the test are statistically significant, x2(l, 
N=321)=297.45,jp<.001. The proportion of MSAs with tax rates below the national 
average is P=.98, and P=.02 for MSAs with corporate tax rates above the national 
average (10.4%>). A follow-up test indicates the proportion of corporate tax rates above 
the national average differ significantly from corporate tax rates below the national 
average, x2(l, N=321)=297.45,/?<.001. Below Table 4.12 outlines the results of the chi-
square test for state corporate tax rates. 
91 
Table 4.12 
Chi-Square Test for 
Variable 
State Corporate Tax 
Rates 
[TaxAbvBel] 
State Corporate Tax Rates Variable 
X2 df N 




Full OLR Model 
A full ordinal logistic regression model inclusive of all the independent variables 
outlined in the conceptual model are run and analyzed for statistical significance and 
effect. The full model is statistically significant, x2=l 84.40, df=15,^>.001. Table 4.4 
below shows that state higher education governance, MSACS, and population, are 
statistically significant at fhe/?<.05, while NEACS regional accrediting agency is 
statistically significant at/?<.10. The results indicate that MSAs with higher levels of 
state higher education governance structures have decreased odds of having higher levels 
of FPHIED by 1.25 times. MSACS and NEACS regional accreditation jurisdictions are 
1.5 and 3.57 times, respectively, less likely to have higher levels of for-profit higher 
education institutions. MSAs with higher levels of population increase the odds of higher 
levels of for-profit higher education institutions by about 122 times. 
The full OLR model reports a moderately high Nagelkerke's Pseudo R =.552, 
which is an indication of good model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Nagelkerke 
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Pseudo R is selected because it corrects the Cox and Snell test for its inability to report a 
perfect fit (R2=1.0), and it is one of the most reported R-square estimates in logistic 
regression (Burns & Burns, 2008; Meyers, Gamst & Guarino, 2006). Interpretation of 
variables in the OLR models with odds ratios less than 1 require transformation by taking 
the inverse of the odds ratio (1/odds ratio) and reversing the description of the results in 
an effort to keep the reporting of results consistent (Osborne, 2006). This technique is 
used for both full and restricted model interpretations, and the inverse odds ratio is 
reported in the corresponding tables. The SPSS output for the full ordinal logistic 
regression is detailed below in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13. 
Full Ordinal Logistic Regression Model 
Inverse 
expB ODDS 





































































































































Nagelkerke's Pseudo R-square = .552, *p<.l, **p<.05 
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Higher Education Governance Variables. It was hypothesized that elevated 
levels of state higher education governance structure would decrease the odds of higher 
numbers of FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in state higher education governance 
structure, from low to medium or medium to high, there is a .22 decrease in the ordered 
log odds of higher levels of FPHIEDs, given all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant. As a result, a one unit decrease in the state HIED governance structure, 
(i.e., from governing board to coordinating body) increases the odds of more FPHIEDs 
by 1.25 times. 
Higher levels of state higher education regulatory characteristics were projected to 
result in decreased odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs. Holding all other variables 
constant, there is a .05 decrease in the ordered log odds of a high level of FPHIED with a 
one unit increase in state higher education regulatory characteristics. Consequently, a 
one unit decrease in the state higher education regulatory characteristics increases the 
odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.05 times. 
Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools (MSACS) jurisdiction was not 
expected to increase or decrease the odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs. However, 
membership in MSACS results in a 3.33 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a 
higher level of FPHIEDs, holding all other variables in the model constant. Therefore, 
membership in MSACS jurisdiction increases the odds of being in a lower category of 
FPHIEDs by 40.22 times. Membership in the New England Association of Colleges and 
Schools (NEACS) results in a 1.27 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher 
level of FPHIEDs, holding all other variables constant. Thus NEACS membership 
increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs by 3.57 times. Northwest Commission on Colleges 
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and Universities (NWCCU) membership results in a .59 decrease in the ordered log odds 
of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, given all other variables in the model are held 
constant. Consequently, membership in NWCCU increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs 
by 1.89 times. Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) membership 
results in a .17 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, 
holding all other variables equal. Therefore, SACS membership increases the odds of 
more FPHIEDs by 1.19 times. Membership in the Western Association of Colleges and 
Schools (WASC) results in a .48 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher 
level of FPHIEDs, given that all other variables are held constant. WASC membership 
decreases the odds of fewer for-profit higher education institutions by 1.62 times. 
Demographic Variables. It was expected that MSAs with higher populations 
would result in increases odds of having higher numbers of FPHIEDs. For a one unit 
increase in population, from low to high, there is a 4.81 increase in the ordered log odds 
of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, given all of the other variables in the model are 
held constant. Therefore, a one unit increase in the population increases the odds of a 
higher category of for-profit higher education institutions by 122 times. 
MSAs with higher levels of median family income were projected to result in 
decreased odds of more for-profit higher education institutions. For a one unit increase in 
median family income, from low to medium or medium to high, there is a .41 increase in 
the ordered log odds of a higher level of FPHIEDs, given all of the other variables in the 
model are held constant. Thus a one unit increase in median family income increases the 
odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.5 times. 
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Demand Variables. It was estimated that higher rates of unemployment would 
increase the odds of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in MSA 
unemployment rates, from low to medium or medium to high, there is a .31 increase in 
the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED, holding all other variables 
equal. So, the odds of being in a higher category of for-profit higher education 
institutions are 1.37 times higher with a one unit increase in MSA unemployment rates. 
Higher levels of high school/GED completion were expected to increase the odds 
of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in high school/GED completion, there 
is a .41 increase in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED, given all 
of the other variables in the model are held constant. As a result, a one unit increase in 
high school/GED completion increases the odds of a higher category of FPHIED about 
1.5 times. 
Bachelor's degree completion was projected to decrease the odds of having more 
FPHIEDs. There is a .57 increase in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of 
FPHIED, holding all other variables equal, for a one unit increase in bachelor's degree 
completion. Therefore, a one unit increase in bachelor's degree completion increases the 
odds 1.77 times of being in a higher category of FPHIEDs. 
Higher rates of advanced degree completion were estimated to decrease the odds 
of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in advanced degree completion, there 
is a .25 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, holding 
all other variables equal. Consequently, a one unit decrease in the advanced degree 
completion increases the odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.28 times. 
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Higher rates of Blacks in the MSA population were expected to increase the odds 
of having more FPHIEDs. Holding all other variables constant, there is a .12 increase in 
the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED for a one unit increase in 
percent of Blacks in the MSA population. This means that a one unit increase in percent 
of Blacks in the MSA population increases the odds of having more FPHIEDs by 1.12 
times. 
It was projected that higher rates of state corporate taxation would decrease the 
odds of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in state corporate tax rates, there 
is a .19 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED, given all of the 
other variables in the model are held constant. As a result, a one unit decrease in the state 
corporate tax rates increases the odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.21 times. 
Restricted OLR Models 
Additional models are run that exclude variables with missing data points (first 
restricted model) and those with multicollinearity issues (second restricted model). The 
first model excluded state corporate tax rates because of the number of missing data 
points that resulted from multi-state MSAs not receiving a state corporate tax rate input. 
The second model excluded median family income and advanced degree completion 
because they were highly correlated with bachelor's degree completion. 
Excluding State Corporate Tax Rates. Removing state corporate tax rates did not 
change the full OLR model. The parameter estimates for this model are approximately 
the same as the parameter estimates reported in the full ordinal regression model. 
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Because eliminating the tax variable does not drastically alter the estimates or the impact 
of the restricted OLR, it will remain in the model. Therefore, no table is presented 
displaying the results of this restricted model. 
Excluding MSA Median Family Income and MSA Advanced Degree Completion. 
It was hypothesized that elevated levels of state higher education governance structure 
would decrease the odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in state 
higher education governance structure, from low to medium or medium to high, there is a 
.22 decrease in the ordered log odds of higher levels of FPHIEDs, given all of the other 
variables in the model are held constant. As a result, a one unit decrease in the state 
HIED governance structure, (i.e., from governing board to coordinating body) increases 
the odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.25 times. 
Higher levels of state higher education regulatory characteristics were projected to 
result in decreased odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs. Holding all other variables 
constant, there is a .06 decrease in the ordered log odds of a high level of FPHIED with a 
one unit increase in state higher education regulatory characteristics. Consequently, a 
one unit decrease in the state higher education regulatory characteristics increases the 
odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.06 times. 
Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools (MSACS) jurisdiction was not 
expected to increase or decrease the odds of higher numbers of FPHIEDs. However, 
membership in MSACS results in a 3.72 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a 
higher level of FPHIEDs, holding all other variables in the model constant. Therefore, 
membership in MSACS jurisdiction increases the odds of being in a lower category of 
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FPHIEDs by 41.42 times. Membership in the New England Association of Colleges and 
Schools (NEACS) results in a 1.16 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher 
level of FPHIEDs, holding all other variables constant. Thus NEACS membership 
increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs by 3.17 times. Northwest Commission on Colleges 
and Universities (NWCCU) membership results in a .68 decrease in the ordered log odds 
of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, given all other variables in the model are held 
constant. Consequently, membership in NWCCU increases the odds of fewer FPHIEDs 
by 1.97 times. Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) membership 
results in a .30 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIEDs, 
holding all other variables equal. Therefore, SACS membership increases the odds of 
fewer FPHIEDs by 1.36 times. Membership in the Western Association of Colleges and 
Schools (WASC) results in a .35 decrease in the ordered log odds of being in a higher 
level of FPHIEDs, given that all other variables are held constant. WASC membership 
decreases the odds of fewer for-profit higher education institutions by 1.42 times. 
It was expected that MSAs with higher populations would have increased odds of 
having higher numbers of FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in MSA population, from 
low to high, there is a 4.97 increase in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of 
FPHIEDs, given all of the other variables in the model are held constant. Therefore, a 
one unit increase in MSA population increases the odds of a higher category of FPHIEDs 
by about 144 times. 
It was estimated that higher rates of MSA unemployment would increase the odds 
of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in MSA unemployment, from low to 
medium or medium to high, there is a .31 increase in the ordered log odds of being in a 
100 
higher level of FPHIED, holding all other variables equal. So, the odds of being in a 
higher category of FPHIEDs are 1.36 times higher with a one unit increase in MSA 
unemployment rate. 
Higher levels of high school/GED completion were expected to increase the odds 
of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in high school/GED completion, there 
is a .5 increase in the ordered log odds of a higher level of FPHIED, given all of the other 
variables in the model are held constant. As a result, a one unit increase in high 
school/GED completion increases the odds of a higher category of FPHIED about 1.64 
times. 
Bachelor's degree completion was projected to decrease the odds of having more 
FPHIEDs. There is a .97 increase in the ordered log odds of being in a higher level of 
FPHIED, holding all other variables equal, for a one unit increase in bachelor's degree 
completion. Therefore, a one unit increase in the bachelor's degree completion increases 
the odds of a higher category of FPHIEDs by 2.62 times. 
Higher rates of Blacks in the population were expected to increase the odds of 
having more FPHIEDs. Holding all other variables constant, there is a .97 increase in the 
ordered log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED for a one unit increase in percent 
of Blacks in MSA population. This means that a one unit increase in percent of Blacks in 
MSA population increases the odds of having more FPHIEDs by 1.13 times. 
It was projected that higher rates of state corporate taxation would decrease the 
odds of having more FPHIEDs. For a one unit increase in state corporate tax rate, there 
is a .22 increase in the log odds of being in a higher level of FPHIED, given all of the 
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other variables in the model are held constant. As a result, a one unit increase in state 
corporate tax rate increases the odds of having more FPHIEDs by 1.24 times. 
The second restricted ordinal logistic regression results in higher odds of more 
FPHIEDs for the following variables when compared to the full ORL model: state higher 
education regulatory characteristics, MSACS, MSA population, high school/GED 
completion, racial composition and corporate taxation. MSACS, MSA population, 
HS/GED and bachelors degree completion are statistically significant at/K.05. Higher 
education governance structure is significant at p=.031. The restricted OLR model 
explains a highly satisfactory portion of the variance in the dependent variable based on 
the widely used estimate of Nagelkerke's Pseudo R =.545 (Meyers, Gamst & Guarino, 
2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). See Table 4.14 below for the restricted OLR model. 
Table 4.14. 
Restricted Ordinal Logistic Regression Model 
Inverse 
expB ODDS 





















































































































Nagelkerke's Pseudo R-square = .545, *p<.l, **p<.05 
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Chapter Summary 
This study hypothesized that the state higher education governance variables 
would predict the number of FPHIEDs. The results show that state higher education 
governance structure and two regional accreditation jurisdictions, MSACS and NEACS, 
are statistically significant in predicting the prevalence of for-profit higher education 
institutions. There is considerable influence of population and levels of educational 
attainment on predicting the levels of FPHIED. While both full and restricted OLR 
models explain a satisfactory amount of the variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), some 




Research findings, implications and conclusions are outlined in this chapter. 
The first section provides an introduction. Then the findings are discussed. Next, the 
governance and policy implications of the study are examined. Following the 
implications are the limitations of the study and contributions to public administration 
and higher education theory. The final section discusses future research. 
Introduction 
Higher education governance has been relatively unchanged over the last 20 
years, while many other aspects of the higher education environment experienced 
tremendous expansion. In other words, governance of higher education has lagged 
behind the major shifts in the higher education environment. The changes in the higher 
education setting have primarily occurred in the area of private, for-profit colleges and 
universities. This sector has proven to be a challenge to regulate at the state and federal 
levels. While increased criticism has triggered a call for improved governance and 
regulation of for-profit higher education, there has been little attention given to what 
governance and regulatory factors actually influence the behavior of for-profit higher 
education institutions. This study identified the higher education governance factors 
that influence the number of FPHIEDs present in a given state. 
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Summary of Findings 
The research question for this study is "What higher education governance 
factors influence the presence of 4-year, degree-granting for-profit higher education 
institutions in the US? " In an effort to answer this question, higher education 
governance factors were examined, in addition to demographic and demand variables, 
to determine their ability to predict the number of FPHIEDs. Bivariate analyses were 
conducted including correlations and chi-square tests. Multivariate analysis was 
performed using ordinal logistic regression to determine the factors that increase the 
odds of MSAs having higher numbers of FPHIEDs. 
This study shows that some higher education governance factors influence the 
prevalence of FPHIEDs, while others have no impact. Specifically, three higher 
education governance factors influenced the number of FPHIEDs present: state higher 
education governance, MSACS and NEACS regional accrediting agencies. Other 
higher education governance factors did not influence the presence of FPHIEDs. The 
non-influential higher education governance factors were state higher education 
regulatory characteristics, four of six regional accrediting agencies (North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools, Northwest Commission on Colleges and 
Universities, Southern Association of Colleges and Universities, and Western 
Association of Schools and Colleges). 
Previous studies have shown the influence of a wide range of governance, 
demographic and demand factors on the location decisions of for-profit businesses 
overall, but not for-profit higher education institutions specifically. This research 
included governance, demographic and demand factors found to be significant in 
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previous location decision and education studies. Only a small number of factors 
emerged as significant predictors. While few hypotheses were supported at the 
bivariate or multivariate levels, the full and restricted ordinal logistic regression models 
explained a large amount of the variance (Nagelkerke's Pseudo R2=.552). A summary 
of each hypothesis is presented below. 
Hi: Stronger state higher education governance structures are more likely to 
result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 1 was supported in both 
bivariate and multivariate analysis. Chi-square tests found differences between 
levels of state higher education governance (no governance, coordinating bodies 
and governing bodies). The full OLR model indicated a one unit decrease in 
state HIED governance increases the odds of higher levels of FPHIEDs by 1.25 
times. 
H2: Stronger state higher education regulatory characteristics are more likely to 
result in lower numbers of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 2 was not supported in the 
OLR analysis. Chi-square tests, however, found statistically significant 
differences in the levels of regulatory characteristics (no regulatory 
characteristics, state approval only, and state approval with US DOE approval). 
H3: NCACS jurisdictions are more likely to result in higher numbers of 
FPHIEDs than states in other regional accrediting agencies (i.e., MSACS, 
NEACS, NWCCU, SACS, and WASC). Chi-square analysis indicated 
statistically significant differences between each of the regional accrediting 
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agencies. Ordinal logistic regression analysis, however, did not fully support 
Hypothesis 3 as stated. The full and restricted OLR models did find MSACS 
and NEACS to be a significant predictor of the prevalence of FPHIEDs. 
H4: Higher populations are more likely to result in higher numbers of FPHIEDs. 
Hypothesis 4 was supported in the bivariate and multivariate analyses. The 
OLR model found a one unit increase in population increases the odds of the 
presence of more FPHIEDs by 122 times. 
H5: Higher median family income is more likely to result in lower numbers of 
FPHIEDs. Median family income was highly correlated with bachelors degree 
completion (r=.716,/K.001). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was eliminated from 
consideration in the restricted OLR models. Because the amount of variance 
explained by the full OLR was not changed drastically when compared to the 
restricted model, median family income remained in the analysis. There was no 
support, however, for Hypothesis 5 in the full OLR analysis. 
He: Higher unemployment rates are more likely to result in higher numbers of 
FPHIEDs. There was no support for Hypothesis 6. 
H7a: Higher rates of high school completion are more likely to result in lower 
numbers of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 7a was not supported in the full OLR model 
but was supported in the restricted OLR analysis indicating a one unit increase 
in high school/GED completion increases the odds of more FPHIEDs by 1.64 
times. Chi-square tests did not find categories of high school completion rates 
to be statistically different from one another. 
H7t,: Higher rates of bachelor's degree completion are more likely to result in 
lower numbers of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 7b was supported in the restricted 
OLR analyses indicating a one unit increase in bachelor's degree completion 
increases the odds of higher levels of FPHIEDs by 2.6 times. Chi-square tests, 
however, did not find statistically significant differences between levels of 
bachelor's degree completion (low, medium, and high). 
H7C: Higher rates of advanced degree completion are more likely to result in 
lower numbers of FPHIEDs. Advanced degree completion was highly 
correlated with bachelors degree completion (r=.864, p<.001). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 7c was eliminated from one of the restricted OLR models. There 
was, however, no support for Hypothesis 7c in the full OLR analysis. 
Hs: Higher rates of Blacks in the population are more likely to result in higher 
numbers of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 8 was not supported in the full OLR model 
or the restricted OLR model. Chi-square tests did not find significant 
differences across levels of Blacks in the population (low, medium, and high). 
H9: Higher state corporate tax rates are more likely to result in lower numbers 
of FPHIEDs. Hypothesis 9 was not supported in the full OLR model. Chi-
square tests found significant differences across levels of taxation (below the 
national average and above national average). 
Significant Predictors 
Higher Education Governance Predictors. The predictor variables used in this 
study were grounded in the public administration, economic development, and higher 
education literatures. Theories of economic regulation assert that high levels of 
regulation restrict economic development by constraining new competitors and 
allowing for unequal distributions of control in favor of politically powerful firms. 
Their influence on non-traditional for-profit entities, like higher education institutions, 
is less clear. The current study selected higher education governance predictors based 
upon classic regulatory and economic development theories, as well as current higher 
education theory. 
This study was productive in that it identified influential governance factors on 
for-profit higher education. The current research supports the theory that higher levels 
of governance restrain FPHIEDs based on ordinal logistic regression modeling, and 
identifies the two governance factors that influence the number of FPHIEDs: state 
higher education governance structure and MSACS, a regional accrediting jurisdiction. 
The full OLR model was statistically significant in predicting the number of FPHIEDs 
(None/Low/High), and its effect size was highly satisfactory at Nagelkerke's Pseudo 
R2=552 (Burns & Burns, 2008; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
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Population. Areas with high rates of population spur economic investment and 
development, which is consistent with most business and economic development 
literature. The findings support the assertion that high levels of for-profit higher 
education institutions locate in places with higher levels of population. Therefore, as 
MSA populations increase, so does the likelihood of increasing the prevalence of 
FPHIEDs. 
Non-Significant HIED Governance Factors 
It was hypothesized that the least stringent regional accrediting jurisdiction, the 
North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, would significantly influence the 
number of FPHIEDs (Kinser, 2005). NCACS regional accrediting agency did not 
perform as expected in either the full model or the restricted model. It is unclear from 
the data or the results, why NCACS was not a pull factor for for-profit higher education 
institution. State higher education regulatory characteristics were expected to be 
inversely related to the number of FPHIEDs. It was not, however, a significant 
contributor in either the full OLR model or the restricted model that eliminated median 
family income and advance degree completion variables. Regulatory and economic 
development theory suggests that regulations serve as obstacles to businesses (Edwards, 
1994; Stigler, 1971). One reason regulatory characteristics did not perform as projected 
may be because regulatory policies for private and independent postsecondary 
education institutions are less restrictive than expected. The results indicated that 
FPHIEDs behave in ways that are different from their for-profit peers. In other words, 
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state regulations do not constrain the operations or operations of for-profit higher 
education institutions. 
Study Implications 
This study aimed to answer the research question, which was "What higher 
education governance factors influence the presence of 4-year, degree-granting for-
profit higher education institutions in the US? ". While the MSA serves as the unit of 
analysis in this research, laws and policies are created at the state and federal levels. 
Consequently, both state and federal governance factors were examined for their impact 
on FPHIEDs. The study identified state higher education governance structure, 
MSACS, NEACS and population as predictors of the presence of FPHIEDs. 
Accordingly, there are governance, policy and implementation implications that result 
from this study. 
Governance Implications 
State higher education governance structures were redesigned in the late 1950s 
into what currently exists in the US. The modern structures have lagged behind the 
advancement of the for-profit sector of higher education. Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 
(2001) claim that governance is important to achieving policy or organizational 
objectives. As a result, politicians might change governance structures in an effort to 
generate more satisfactory outcomes. This study found evidence that state higher 
education governance structures have statistically significant impact on the number of 
for-profit higher education institutions present within an MSA. In essence, MSAs with 
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state higher education governing bodies have fewer for-profit higher education 
institutions within their respective borders. 
This suggests the need to strengthen state higher education governance 
structures, from coordinating bodies to governing bodies, as means to regulate the 
behavior of FPHIEDs. Therefore, strengthened higher education governance structures 
give greater authority to state agencies to regulate for-profit higher education 
institutions and have the ability to enhance higher education policy. Unintended is the 
potential for greater restriction of public and private non-profit institutions. Currently 
there is concern that non-profit postsecondary institutions, particularly public 
institutions, are heavily regulated and overburdened. Increased regulations of FPHIEDs 
may increase the regulations of all higher education institutions. 
Policy Implications 
Stronger governance structures have the ability to improve the development and 
effectiveness of policy (Lynn, Heinrich & Hill, 2001). This study assumes that state 
higher education policies are established to regulate the behaviors of higher educational 
institutions in the state. While the findings lack evidence to support any statistically 
significant impact of the state higher education regulatory characteristics on the 
behaviors of FPHIEDs, the implications have policy significance. 
Evaluations of higher education and economic development policies at both the 
state and federal levels are needed to determine effectiveness in meeting stated 
objectives, and to determine the impact of unintended consequences. For example, state 
higher education policy that regulates for-profit higher education institutions may be 
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deemed effective. However, its restriction of FPHIEDs may undermine economic 
development policies that seek to lure business and industry into the state. In the same 
way, federal higher education policies should be evaluated. Some federal policies that 
seek to increase postsecondary educational achievement may, in fact, encourage the 
proliferation of for-profit higher education institutions and ultimately minimize the 
value of higher education attainment. Another unintended consequence is that by 
increasing regulations of for-profit higher education institutions, and therefore 
restricting their operations, the higher education options of minorities and working 
adults will be limited. Because FPHIEDs target minorities and working adults, 
restraining FPHIEDs will likely limit the educational opportunities of those populations, 
thereby undermining postsecondary achievement goals at state and national levels. 
The research presented here supports the need for more consistent and 
strengthened federal regulations of for-profit higher education institutions. Currently, 
the structure that devolves federal regulation to independent regional accrediting 
agencies seems inadequate. Four of the six regional accrediting agencies were not 
found to have statistically significant influences on the number of FPHIEDs. 
Differences found between regional accrediting agencies require consistency to ensure 
regulatory equity across the US states. Therefore, a federal level evaluation of regional 
accreditation policies is necessary to assess equity and equality across agencies in the 
regulation of for-profit higher education institutions. Higher education regulatory 
consistency across US states is beneficial. The establishment of uniform federal 
standards and policies minimizes "accreditation shopping" (Kinser, 2005). It facilitates 
less complex evaluation of institutional adherence to federal regulations. Additionally, 
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it mitigates concerns of discrimination among regional accrediting agencies (AAUP, 
2007). 
Formulation of new policies, strengthening current policies, and evaluating all 
higher education policies that regulate the operations of FPHIEDs, such as higher 
education regulations and/or consumer protection laws, will serve to benefit the public 
good. The result is either further protection of the public from the profit-seeking 
behaviors of for-profit higher education institutions or promotion of economic 
development objectives. For example, if a state desires to limit the spread of for-profit 
higher education institutions and/or decrease the risk of diploma mills within its borders 
it should consider strengthening its higher education policies. California is a state that 
could potentially benefit from increased regulations of higher education institutions. 
California currently hosts a large number of FPHIEDs but the state higher education 
agency exhibits no regulatory characteristics. On the other hand, a state such as 
Delaware may desire to increase the educational choices of its residents while recruiting 
new businesses to its state. Delaware may consider loosening its regulations of for-
profit higher education institutions and permit them to establish physical campuses in 
their state. 
Implementation Implications 
There are also implications pertaining to implementation. State higher 
education agencies that exhibit strong governance structures can take a bottom-up 
approach to implementation, primarily because they have legislative authority to act. 
Governing bodies, strong form of state higher education governance, can develop their 
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own programs to regulate for-profit higher education institutions. Once the program or 
policy is developed, those agencies can implement them. This is a bottom-up model of 
implementation. The result of such an implementation is diversity of regulation of for-
profit higher education institutions across the states in the US (Matland, 1995). 
From a top-down approach to implementation, state agencies must 
administratively implement changes in state higher education governance structure and 
policies from elected officials. Implementation done in this way focuses on the 
language of the policy, which purposes to guide the actions of state agency 
administrators. Public administrators must clarify policy goals, and then execute 
policies in ways that minimize impact on other, sometimes contradictory, legislative 
goals (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Matland, 1995). Hence, legislators must be specific 
about goals pertaining to the regulation of for-profit higher education institutions and/or 
economic development initiatives, as both can work in support of each other or against 
each other. For example, restricting for-profit higher education institutions can 
undermine recruitment and preservation of businesses in a state. Additionally, public 
agencies that historically do not interact, such as consumer protection agencies and 
higher education agencies, must work together to maximize effectiveness in meeting 
legislative objectives. The top-down approach requires state higher education 
administrators to take care to match implementation practices to legislatively sanctioned 
objectives and outcomes (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). 
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Limitations of the Study 
The literature on business decision-making is rife with examinations of the 
impact of wage rates, unionization, land use and bandwagon effects. According to the 
literature, wage rates and high rates of unionization negatively influence the various 
types of decision-making of manufacturing and service firms. Wage rates, land use, 
unionization and bandwagon effects have been primarily studied in the context of 
manufacturing and foreign direct investments, which are distinctively different sectors 
than for-profit higher education. While these factors have been found to be significant 
in previous research of business decisions, they are outside the scope of this study. 
Additional factors may precipitate the establishment of FPHIEDs in some MSAs 
as opposed to others that are neither accounted for in the literature nor included in this 
study. The availability of rentable/leasable office space, the primary venue of product 
or service delivery for FPHIEDs, is considered to be an influential factor in the site 
decisions of for-profit higher education institutions. It may be that the location 
selections of FPHIEDs are better explained in terms of the availability of quality office 
space within an MSA. While the prevalence of office space could have some 
explanatory power, it was not included in the study. Ease of access and close proximity 
to major interstates and local roads may also be drivers of for-profit higher education 
institutions location decisions at the site level, as for-profit higher education institutions 
are typically located near highway exits or intersections of major streets (Bailey, 
Badway & Gumport, 2001). This variable, however, was excluded from this study 
because it is specific to final site selections, which occur after a broader location 
decision has been made. 
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Contribution to Theory 
Public Administration 
The current study contributes to public administration literature by providing 
support for the application of regulatory theory to for-profit higher education 
institutions, which is considered here to be a non-traditional business entity. It 
corroborates some regulatory factors that influence location outcomes of FPHIEDs as 
outlined in the literature such as governance structure. This research highlights the 
limited influence of by-proxy federal regulations, namely regional accrediting agencies. 
While regional accrediting agencies have been utilized as a means to regulate access to 
Title IV federal student aid funds, they have not served as a means of regulating the 
proliferation FPHIEDs. The result is numerous calls for greater and more direct federal 
regulation of for-profit higher education. 
Higher Education 
In addition to its contribution to public administration, this study adds to the 
higher education literature as well. First, it establishes a foundation for the study of 
governance of FPHIEDs which has received little attention in the education literature. 
Understanding the higher education governance factors that influence the operation of 
FPHIEDs permits comparisons to traditional higher education institutions. Second, this 
research advances research on FPHIEDs that expands beyond academic quality and 
diploma mills (Kinser, 2005), fraudulent recruitment and marketing practices (GAO, 
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2009 & 2010), Title IV funding improprieties and high federal loan default rates (GAO, 
2009 & 2010; Kelly, 2001). Third, it refutes the influence of variables that have been 
attributed to the operations of FPHIEDs, such as the presence of minorities and 
unemployment rates. 
Future Research 
One of the goals of this study was to provide a macro-level analysis of the 
higher education regulatory environment and its impact on for-profit higher education. 
This macro-level analysis can be expounded on by additional research. Findings of this 
study suggest three areas of future research. The first area is an institutional-level 
analysis of FPHIEDs could identify specific factors that influence the decision-making 
of for-profits. It may also serve to uncover additional higher education regulatory 
characteristics. 
The second area of future research pertains to the creation of a valid measure of 
state higher education regulatory levels. This line of research could comprise 
interviews or surveys of state higher education staff members, for-profit and non-profit 
colleges and universities, regional accreditation staff, and US DOE staff members. It 
would assist in compiling a list of variables and assessing the accuracy of the 
constructed regulatory levels. The development of valid measures of state higher 
education regulatory levels can provide consistency in public administration and 
education research of higher education governance and regulation. It would also 
provide a valuable tool in conducting state comparative analysis research of higher 
education. 
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The third area of future research is a comprehensive review of the state policies 
regarding for-profit higher education institutions. This is needed to determine if 
policies comply with state level goals of the agency or the legislature related to higher 
education oversight and regulation. Evaluation of state higher education policy could 
provide a foundation on which to build a case to strengthen current state higher 
education policies that provide oversight and/or regulation of for-profit higher education 
institutions. In addition, an examination of specific state policies that explain the 
distributions of for-profit higher education institutions among the states is needed. 
Investigating the impact of specific state regulatory policies and legislation is a natural 
outgrowth of research from this study. A clearer understanding of the precise 
influences of the behaviors of for-profit higher education institutions may help clarify 
distinctions between legitimate for-profit higher education institutions and diploma 
mills (Kinser, 2005). 
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Regional Accrediting Agencies and Jurisdictions (as of April 2009) 




Middle States Association of 
College and Schools 
Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education (MSACS) 
New England Association of 
Schools and Colleges 
Commission on Institutions of 
Higher Education (NEASC) 
Degree granting institutions 




master's, doctoral degree 
granting institutions. 
DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, 
Puerto Rico, US Virgin 
Islands, District of 
Columbia 
CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, 
VT 
North Central Association of 
Colleges and Schools The 
Higher Learning Commission 
(NCACS) 
Degree-granting institutions 
incorporated in the states 
within jurisdiction. 
AZ, AR, CO, IL, IN, 
IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, 
NE, NM, ND, OH, OK, 
SD, WV, WI, WY 
Northwest Commission on 
Colleges and Universities 
(NWCCU) 
Southern Association of 
Colleges and Schools 
Commission on Colleges 
(SACS) 
Institutions of higher 
education that award 
associate, bachelors, 




AK, ID, MT, NV, OR, 
UT,WA 
AL, FL, GA, KY, LA, 
MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, 
VA 
Western Association of Schools 
and Colleges Accrediting 
Commission for Senior 
Colleges and Universities 
(WASC) 
Baccalaureate degree or 
higher institutions. 







Original Dependent and Independent Variables and Sources 
Variable Original Level of Measurement Source 
For-Profit Higher 
Education 









No regulatory characteristics (0), Registration 
only (1), Registration and State Agency 
Approval (2), Registration, State Agency 
Approval and US DOE Approved 






MSACS, NEASC, NCACS, NWCCU, SACS, 
WASC (nominal) CHEA, 2009 




Median family income per MSA in US dollars US Census, 
(2007), adjusted for inflation (ratio) 2009 
Unemployment 
Rates MSA unemployment rates (ratio) 
US Census, 
2009 
High school/GED completion, college degree 
Rates of Educational completion, advanced degree completion as a US Census, 
Attainment percentage of population per MSA (ratio) 2009 
US Census, 
Racial Composition Percentages of blacks living in the MSA (ratio) 2009 
Tax Rate 
State corporate tax rate in each state as a 
percent (ratio) OECD, 2009 
Appendix C 
Table CI 























Name of State Higher Education 
Agency 
Alabama Commission on Higher 
Education 
Alaska Commission on 
Postsecondary Education 
University of Alaska System 
Arizona Board of Regents 
Arkansas Department of Higher 
Education 
California Postsecondary Education 
Commission 
Colorado Department of Higher 
Education 
Connecticut Department of Higher 
Education 
Delaware Higher Education 
Commission 
Office of the Office of the State 
Superintendent of Education 
State University System of Florida 
Georgia Board of Regents 
Hawaii Board of Regents 
Idaho State Board of Education 
Illinois Board of Higher Education 
Indiana Commission for Higher 
Education 
Board of Regents, State of Iowa 
Kansas Board of Regents 
Kentucky Council of Postsecondary 
Education 
Louisian Board of Regents 

























Maryland Higher Education 
Commission Governing 
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Table CI (cont'd) 
























Name of State Higher Education 
Agency 
Massachusetts Board of Higher 
Education 
*Office of Postsecondary Education 
Minnesota Office of Higher 
Education 
Mississippi State Institutions of 
Higher Learning 
Missoure Department of Higher 
Education 
Montana University Systems 
Nebraska's Coordinating 
Commission for Postsecondary 
Education 
Nevada System of Higher 
Education 
New Hampshire Postsecondary 
Education Commission 
University System of New 
Hampshire 
New Jersey Commission on Higher 
Education 
New Mexico Higher Education 
Department 
New York State Education 
Department 
The University of North Carolina 
North Dakota University System 
Ohio Board of Regents 
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education 
Oregon University System 
Pennsylvania State Department of 
Education 
Puerto Rico Council on Higher 
Education 
Rhode Island Board of Governors 
for Higher Education 



























Table CI (cont'd) 













Name of State Higher Education 
Agency 
South Dakota Board of Regents 
Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission 
Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board 
Utah System for Higher Education 
Vermont State Colleges 
State Council of Higher Education 
for Virginia 
Washington Higher Education 
Coordinating Board 
West Virginia Higher Education 
Policy Commission 
University of Wisconsin System 
Wyoming Community College 
Commission 




























































































































Table Dl (cont'd) 
State Higher Education Governance Structure and Regulatory Characteristics 
State 




























































Operational Definitions and Coding Rubric for Original (Pre-Collapsed) State HIED 
Regulatory Characteristics 




1 Ability to Restrict: Registration 
Only 
No restrictions of FPHIEDs ability 
to operate within the state 
Limited ability to restrict FPHIEDs 
operation within the state 
Ability to Restrict: Registration and Agency approval required without 
State Agency Approval 
Ability to Restrict: Registration, 
State Agency Approval, and 
USDOE Approved Accreditation 
USDOE accreditation for FPHIEDs 
to operate in the state 
Agency approval required with 
USDOE accreditation for FPHIEDs 
to operate in the state 
142 
VITA 
Rhonda L. Myers 
Old Dominion University 
Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration 
College of Business and Public Administration 
Norfolk, VA 23529 
Rhonda Myers is a higher education practitioner with dynamic, energetic and creative 
ideas. She has more than 10 years of experience in advising, recruitment and training, 
supervision, evaluation, budgeting and programming. Her commitment to college 
students and student development is unmatched. She is a creative, analytical and 
independent thinker with out-of-the-box ideas, who is also an articulate and persuasive 
speaker with the ability to inspire and energize others. 
Education 
Ph.D. Public Administration and Urban Policy 
Old Dominion University, August 2011 
M.B.A. Human Resources 
Kent State University, August 2002 
B.A. Criminology and Communication 
The Ohio State University, June 1999 
Professional Experience 
2008 - 2010 International Education Advisor 
California State University, Northridge, CA 
Hillsborough Community College, Tampa, FL 
2006 - 2008 Graduate Research Assistant 
Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 
2003 - 2006 Director of Student Activities 
Virginia Union University 
Richmond, VA 
